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UAC to build four Su-75 prototypes
17 August 2022

Russia’s United Aircraft (UAC) is to build four prototypes of the Su-75 Checkmate, as it continues production of the Su-57. UAC chief executive Yuri Slyusar revealed the plan at Russia’s Army 2022 event, according to Russian news agency TASS.
“We use advanced super-computer technologies in the Checkmate project, which enables us to cut substantially the timeframe of building the prototype and begin the flight tests already in 2024. Now preparations have been launched for the production of two prototypes. In all, we plan to build four prototypes.” At its launch at Russia’s MAKS air show in July 2021, Slyusar had said the first flight [of the Su-75] would take place in 2023. Production is intended to start in 2027.
A separate report carried by the RIA Novosti agency quotes Russian defence official Dmitry Shugaev as saying that the country is willing not only to export the Su-75, but also to establish joint production with international partners. The type is planned as an affordable fifth-generation fighter.


Slusar adds that four additional Su-57s have been built under a defence ministry contract. According to TASS, Russia’s military will have a total of 22 examples [of the Su-57] by late 2024, with this to rise to 76 by 2028.

In addition, UAC and Russia’s defence ministry signed an agreement for delivery of an unspecified number of Su-34 fighter bombers. The Su-34 acquisition could be to replace aircraft lost since Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February.
While the exact number is impossible to confirm, Russia has possibly lost over 100 fixed-wing aircraft during the conflict... adding 9 August attack on a Russian base in Crimea, to have destroyed 9 to 10 aircraft.

Similarly, Moscow at the event ordered undisclosed quantities of Ka-52M and Mi-28NM, again likely to replace assets lost during the war with Ukraine.

Russian Helicopters also used Army 2022 to unveil its BAS-750 unmanned helicopter, which has a maximum take-off weight of 750kg (1,650lb), and a payload of 200kg. Endurance is a claimed 6h, and the system can transmit data up to 81nm (150km). BAS-750 missions include search and rescue, cartography, and the monitoring of key installations.

https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/ua ... 74.article

Orel escribió:https://twitter.com/piotr_butowski/stat ... iW2d8rAAAA
https://twitter.com/piotr_butowski/stat ... qRuN8rAAAA

champi escribió:Irforme de RUSI en abierto, "The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence": https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air- ... -final.pdf

...
Executive Summary
· Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks.
· During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
· Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
· Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
· From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
· Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
· Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired stand-off missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
· Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
· The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria.
· It follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, and ultimately augmented and replaced with Western equivalents over time, the VKS will regain the ability to pose a major threat.
· In the short term, Ukraine also needs large numbers of additional MANPADS and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, such as the Gepard, to sustain and increase its ability to intercept the Shahed-136s and protect its remaining power infrastructure and repairs to damaged facilities.
· In the medium term, Ukraine needs cost-effective ways to defend itself against the Shahed-136. One option could be compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective against them.
· The Ukrainian Air Force fighter force needs modern Western fighters and missiles to sustainably counter the VKS. Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect.
· Any Western fighter supplied in the short–medium term needs to be capable of dispersed operations using mobile maintenance equipment and small support teams, and flying from relatively rough runways, to avoid being neutralised by Russian long-range missile strikes.
...

Russian airpower could regain initiative in Ukraine: think tank
16 November 2022
A think tank warns that Russian airpower could regain the initiative in Ukrainian skies if Kyiv is not urgently supported with air defence systems and western fighter aircraft.
https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/ru ... 91.article

champi escribió:Rusia recibe un nuevo lote de Su-30SM2 y Yak-130: https://tass.com/defense/1539875
Eso sí, no especifican el número de unidades.

champi escribió:Rusia recibe un nuevo lote de Su-30SM2 y Yak-130: https://tass.com/defense/1539875

Eso sí, no especifican el número de unidades.

Orel escribió:

Russian airpower could regain initiative in Ukraine: think tank
16 November 2022
A think tank warns that Russian airpower could regain the initiative in Ukrainian skies if Kyiv is not urgently supported with air defence systems and western fighter aircraft.
https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/ru ... 91.article

Sólo corrijo: no se trataría de "regain" (recuperar), si no de obtenerla, porque la VVS nunca la ha tenido en este conflicto.

Atticus escribió:Es que si podian haber obtenido esa superioridad desde el dia uno y no lo hicieron.... Eso solo significaria que habria que haberlos colgado por las gonadas desde mucho mas alto y desde antes.
Si no tienen esa superioridad es porque no pueden. Punto. Y dudo que vayan a poder.

Ademas se han hecho nuevos contratos este verano de cuantia indeterminada, probablemente para reemplazar las perdidas de combate y accidentes de Su-34NVO, Ka.52M y Mi-28NM, en el caso de Su-34 serian en torno a una docena o alguno mas y el numero probablente no esta cerrado por si hay mas perdidas