Moderadores: Lepanto, poliorcetes, Edu, Orel
Orel escribió:Ayer la USAF declaró IOC -operativo inicial- el F-35A:
http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/t ... ready.aspx
Y vídeo al respecto:
Y un poco despejando dudas sobre si el mal momento en Turquía afectaría a su relación con el F-35, se activa en EEUU el escuadrón que entrenará específicamente a los turcos:
http://alert5.com/2016/08/03/63rd-fight ... 35-pilots/
Orel escribió:Por lo tanto si Israel finalmente compra B (que no es seguro) y sin haber dicho aún por qué, aunque me parezca raro lo más factible dado todos los precedentes es que fuese para tener fuerza aeronaval.
poliorcetes escribió:No lo tengo claro. De pasar algo así, los daños que se recibirían en Líbano serían demenciales porque el Jel ha'Avir se emplearía a fondo.
Después de 2006, no creo que Hizbollah quiera volver a jugar con tanto en contra
Shomer escribió:pueden alcanzar la Base de Ramat David en el norte, por lo que hay un riesgo cierto de que en la próxima guerra logren paralizarla a base de salvas permanentes de cohetes.
Shomer escribió:Hasta ahora Israel podía "justificar" sus ataques de represaría argumentando que Hezbollah se dedica a bombardear los pueblos y ciudades de Israel como estrategia única de guerra buscando impacto mediático y generación de terror en la población civil de Israel, dejando de lado cualquier intento de atacar objetivos militares.
Shomer escribió:poliorcetes escribió:No lo tengo claro. De pasar algo así, los daños que se recibirían en Líbano serían demenciales porque el Jel ha'Avir se emplearía a fondo.
Después de 2006, no creo que Hizbollah quiera volver a jugar con tanto en contra
Hasta ahora Israel podía "justificar" sus ataques de represaría argumentando que Hezbollah se dedica a bombardear los pueblos y ciudades de Israel como estrategia única de guerra buscando impacto mediático y generación de terror en la población civil de Israel, dejando de lado cualquier intento de atacar objetivos militares.
Pero se sabe que la próxima guerra con esta gente va a ser muy diferente, y con los recursos que tienen ahora pueden dedicarse a atacar las principales bases de Tzahal por medio Israel, inclusive la Base de Ramat David.
Si cambian de estrategia, va a ser mucho mas difícil para Israel justificar la destrucción sistemática de las infraestructuras del Libano. No digo que no se vaya a hacer, pero tras la guerra tendríamos gravisimos problemas legales en los tribunales internacionales.
Por otro lado, si la Base de Ramat David es afectada en su operativa, habría que recargar sobre la Base de Tel Nof casi todo el peso de la campaña aérea, y eso seria en verdad una pesadilla para los mandos de la HHA, especialmente en términos de logística.
August 15, 2016 ...To find out if the aircraft [F-35] can perform as advertised, The Heritage Foundation recently interviewed 31 of the 174 Air Force pilots who have completed training on the F-35A. The pilots, used to flying the F-15C, F-15E, F-16C or A-10, were asked to assess their former fighters’ handling characteristics and dogfighting faculties and then, using those as their baselines, answer the same questions about the F-35A.
Each pilot expressed a high degree of confidence in the Lightning II’s dogfighting and surface attack prowess. Even with developmental restrictions that limit the F-35A’s responsiveness and ability to maneuver, every pilot picked the F-35A over his former jet in a majority of dogfight scenarios.
Their comments revealed a shared belief that this jet is on the precipice of being extraordinary:
• “You didn’t ask about its ability to suppress enemy air defenses — one F-35 can do the work of three F-16CJs faster and with much greater accuracy.”
• “The ID capability of the sensor package is unmatched. So much so that we won’t buy into another system’s threat declaration — the jets are always faster and spot-on.”
There wasn’t a Pollyanna among the 31. Every pilot noted things that needed improving. The layers within the Multi-Function Display were often cumbersome to page through. The Tactical Situation Display was still depicting several “ghost” images for a single target aircraft, and one or two complained about occasional in-flight failures/resets of the jet’s AESA radar.
But the pilots noted that every software update has brought incredible improvements, and they were confident that the remaining glitches would be solved when the next software update is fielded next summer.
Still the delays and cost overruns in the F-35 acquisition program have led many to question the Pentagon’s “concurrent development” approach. The military recognized, as it committed to the program, that technology was advancing so rapidly it would be hard to field a jet that was not already approaching obsolescence. To deal with that, they elected to acquire the aircraft as components were still undergoing some stages of research and development. That concurrent development approach entails risk: Even small changes in the weight, size, performance and schedule of any component would affect the weight, size, performance and schedule of the entire system.
The risk of developmental delays and cost overruns were accepted to mitigate an even bigger risk: that the United States would field a jet that was all but obsolete by the time it became operational. Only extraordinary leadership could mitigate those risks and, while that should have been factored into the whole of the acquisition process, it wasn’t.
In its first 18 years of existence, the F-35 program office had nine directors — one every two years. But the current F-35 program office executive has been in place for four years and, in that time, the program has turned around.
Clearly, the pilots interviewed by Heritage feel the concurrent development approach is delivering on its operational promise and the United States is on its way to fielding the freshest, leading-edge technology to ever take flight. That is reason enough for the Pentagon to hold on to the benefits and refine the bureaucratic issues within the concurrent development approach.
If we are smart, our military will use the lessons of the F-35 to refine its process into the most dynamic, adaptable and efficient acquisition models ever conceived. Concurrent development should be the foundation of that process, and the biggest lesson learned to date is that it requires exceptional leadership.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 ... velopment/
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