Misiones CAS, COIN y contra objetivos de oportunidad

[poliorcetes]

y para qué narices lo quiere suiza? No lo pillo, en serio

[polluelo]

Para hacer alarmas los fines de semana.

[Roberto Montesa]

Será entre semana.... los findes no descansan?

[PelotonRueda]

Buenas.

Para hacer alarmas los fines de semana.

Ni así Polluelo , necesitarían treinta millones de francos por año, y por falta de pilotos no seria posible antes de seis años.
"...Pour assurer des interventions aériennes 24 heures sur 24, il faudrait former nombre de nouveaux pilotes et investir quelque 30 millions de francs par an. Cela ne sera pas possible avant six ans, selon le ministre de la défense..."
http://www.20min.ch/ro/news/suisse/story/11984733

Ah, para consuelo, el servicio de alerta a funcionado bien, las autoridades suizas fueron informadas a las 04h30 por el ejercito italiano.
"...le service d'alerte a bien fonctionné, puisque les autorités suisses ont été informées à 04h30 par l'armée italienne..."

¿ Desastrosos nosotros ?

Saludos.

[poliorcetes]

Pero nosotros no tenemos los dineros de la élite. Mejor que unas FFAA: "si me tocas los cojones, congelo tus cuentas". Y andando. Eso sí que es disuasión nucelar

[Roberto Montesa]

La verdad, no entiendo que en pleno siglo XXI suiza no paga por eso a sus solidos aliados, como ha pasado en las republicas balticas, y desmantela esa inutil defensa aerea.

[PelotonRueda]

Buenas.

no entiendo que en pleno siglo XXI suiza no paga por eso a sus solidos aliados

Roberto Montesa , Suiza dispone de un acuerdo con Francia para estos casos.

En mismo enlace anterior: "...La Suisse dispose d'un accord avec la France pour ce genre de cas..."

Mejor que unas FFAA: "si me tocas los cojones, congelo tus cuentas"

Todo sea que un zorro con suficiente peso en el escenario, entre en el gallinero y se coma a las gallinas y a sus huevos de oro...En este caso, no habría bunker bajo cada vivienda que aguantase el envite...El yoduro de potasio estaría a la orden del día .

Saludos.

[poliorcetes]

Israel Air Force opts for drones over attack helicopters
AircraftHelicoptersDrones & RoboticsUAVsMay 31, 2014
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The Israel Air Force has placed a second order with Elbit Systems' for the Hermes 900 Medium-Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial System
Hermes 900 Medium-Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial System. Photo: Elbit Systems.
Israel has phased out the AH-1S Cobra helicopter gunship, in favour of using more drones, the Reuters news agency reports. The increasing reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) has evolved through the years, as the unmanned aircraft assumed increasingly complex missions, and proved themselves as an indispensable asset in the continuous war against terror along and beyond Israel’s borders.

Despite the improvements and extensive support, the Cobras have encountered significant ageing challenges, some causing fatal accidents. One squadron has been disbanded few years ago, the second was closed late in 2013. But, according to Reuters, The Cobras were axed as part of budget cuts. “They were sort of stuck in the middle in terms of the role they could fulfil, so we decided to do without them,” a senior military officer told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

The air force aims to carry out strikes “within minutes” of receiving a request from ground troops – a timing that he said would likely be met by drones and helicopters rather than jets

Israel has retained two squadrons of Apache helicopters, operating AH-64A and D models. Squadron 161, formerly the second Cobra squadron, was commissioned in 2012 at the Palmahim base, as a Hermes 450 (Zik) UAV squadron. Squadron 160 decommissioned in August 2013 is likely to follow.

According to Reuters, operations have been shifted toward drones rather than manned aircraft and helicopters. According to the agency’s correspondent Dan Williams, the mission of the Cobras are now performed by unmanned aircraft, currently operating under several squadrons. Israel is known to be operating the Elbit Systems’ Hermes 450 and newer Hermes 900, as well as the IAI Heron TP dubbed Eitan. Officially these drones are operated on intelligence gathering and targeting missions only, but, according to foreign sources, they are also carrying guided weapons. subscribe

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All UAVs operated by the IAF are locally made the country’s defense industries. These drones are increasingly used to patrol combat zones such as the Gaza Strip and South Lebanon.

The Israel Air & Space Force has withdrawn the last AH-1S Cobra from active service late in 2013. The mission of the helicopter gunships have been assumed by locally built drones. The Cobra seen in this photo was modified to carry the Tamuz (SPIKE NLOS) attack missile, capable of striking mobile targets at a range of 25 km with pin-point accuracy. Photo: RAFAEL

http://defense-update.com/20140531_isra ... pters.html

Ojo, lo que se sustituye es al helo de ataque ligero y más que amortizado. El apache sigue vivito y coleando, entre otras cosas porque fuera del COIN, en entornos de amenaza elevada, es más útil y probable que sobreviva

[elder]

Y también el más antiguo, baqueteado y monomotor.

NO meterse con el Cobra.

[polluelo]

Ojo, lo que se sustituye es al helo de ataque ligero y más que amortizado.

Ya, lo que se ha dicho siempre. Aparecen nuevas herramientas que permiten hacer las cosas que antes se hacian con otras herramientas.

Si el mundo fuera igual que cuando apareció el Cobra ahora lo sustituirian por otra cosa igual, como el mundo ha cambiado y mucho en vez de otro helo o uno de esos supercañoneros se usa un no tripulado que no existia por entonces.

[poliorcetes]

tremendo y recomendable artículo

A-10s Saved the Day in Botched Afghanistan Raid
by War is Boring via War is Boring - Medium

On June 9, five U.S. Special Operations Forces commandos died when a U.S. Air Force B-1 bomber mistakenly attacked their position in southern Afghanistan—presumably dropping JDAM satellite-guided bombs on the commandos from high altitude.

The accidental bombing comes as the Air Force is trying—with some success—to convince Congress to allow the flying branch to retire all 230 of its remaining A-10 Warthog attack jets, which specialize in low, slow attacks in close proximity to friendly troops.

The Air Force insists the high-flying B-1 and other warplanes can adequately replace the A-10. But the June 9 incident undermines the Air Force’s case. Likewise, a similar incident seven years ago involving a B-1—“Bone” to the ground troops—and A-10s highlights the yawning differences between the two plane types and their pilots.

On Jan. 15, 2007, a force of 200 British Royal Marines and other troops including a Joint Terminal Air Controller, or JTAC, crossed a canal of the Helmand River in southern Afghanistan and attacked Jugroom Fort, a walled complex that was a key Taliban strongpoint.

The assault was a fiasco for the Brits. “The besieged Taliban fighters proved resilient, and sprayed the Z Company Marines with gunfire,” The Guardian reported. “Within minutes the British force suffered four casualties, mostly gunshot wounds.”

The British troops retreated. They were back across the river when the realized they had left behind a wounded man—30-year-old Lance Corporal Matthew Ford. The Brits radioed for help. Two A-10 pilots were flying nearby.

“Suddenly, our flight was re-tasked to support an allied commando unit and their JTAC,” one of the A-10 pilots recalled in a widely-circulated written account. War is Boring agreed not to print the pilot’s name, as his opinions contradict Air Force policy.

“We quickly checked in with the JTAC and received a standard situation update,” the pilot recalled. “Using our old-school 1:50 paper maps, we hastily plotted the factor locations with grease pencil and quickly developed visual target reference points for us to use within our own flight.”

We were given several known enemy firing positions to target north of the canal and we began hitting them with 30-millimeter [guns]. A B-1 bomber checked in with a full load of GBU-38 and GBU-31 JDAMs.
After we conducted the initial strikes, my flight lead sent me to the tanker to get gas first. While en route to the tanker, the JTAC gave the preparatory call for all players to receive the recovery game plan. I was forced off frequency to facilitate my tanker rejoin.
Once plugged on the tanker, I had the tanker pipe the frequency through the boom interphone so I could at least listen to the communications while getting gas.
The Royal Marines came up with a desperate and daring plan. Marines would strap themselves to the outsides of two British Army Apache gunship helicopters and dart back across the river to pick up Ford. They wanted the A-10s and B-1 to cover them.


“This is going to be a timed strike to cover the helicopter ingress,” the British commander radioed. “The B-1 is going to drop four GBU-31s on the [Taliban positions] just prior to the helicopters crossing the canal. The A-10s will escort the Apaches in and lay suppressing fire on the enemy firing positions.”

“Once dismounted from the helicopters, A-10s have overwatch,” the commander continued. “Once we get our guy, we’re gonna load him up, egress the area, and Bone and Hawgs are going to smash the place to bits.”

“Jesus Christ,” the tanker’s boom operator muttered on overhearing the plan.

“The B-1 was now rushing to get the targeting solutions for the JDAMs,” the A-10 pilot wrote. “The JTAC ordered a bomb-on-coordinate nine-line”—a detailed attack order in standardized format—“and the B-1 was frantically attempting to repeat the coordinates while plugging them into his targeting system.”

“At the same time I was attempting to visualize where the coordinates were plotted, using just the verbal data alone—a skill set I learned from some experienced A-10 pilots,” the Warthog flier recalled.

The more experienced A-10 flight lead was frantically doing the same—in essence, checking the JTAC and B-1 crew’s work. The Taliban and the British troops—to say nothing of their madcap rescue force—were in very close proximity.

The B-1 is a high-flying, sluggish aircraft. Rather than maneuvering to attack down low based on visual cues, it lobs satellite-guided bombs to hit pre-designated coordinates. For a B-1 to hit the bad guys and avoid the good guys, the numbers have to be perfect.

“One set of coordinates made the hair on the back of my neck stand up,” the A-10 pilot wrote. “I glanced at my canopy, where I had very similar coordinates written in grease pencil and circled with ‘FDLY’”—code for friendly troops—“written on top. Before I could put two and two together, I heard the JTAC clear the B-1 hot for the four JDAMs.”

“Immediately after the ‘cleared hot,’ I heard my flight lead interject.”

“Abort! Abort! Abort!” the flight lead barked into the radio.

“State reason!” the B-1 crew demanded.

“Screw reason!” the A-10 leader responded. “God damn it, abort—you’re about to kill friendlies!”

The B-1 waved off. Irritated, the British JTAC asked why his bomber had aborted.

“You passed your own coordinates!” the A-10 flight lead shot back.

“The JTAC disagreed with that assessment,” the junior A-10 pilot wrote. “What I heard on the radio next still impresses me to this day. My flight lead asked the JTAC what GPS system he was using, then walked him through the page menus to confirm he was reading the system correctly.”

“This took an amazing amount of prior self-study and composure during paramount stress.”

The JTAC followed the senior Warthog pilot’s directives. “Holy shit, mate,” the air controller said. “You’re right. We’re spinning everything and we’re re-setting this.”

“Jesus Christ,” the boom operator said again.

“Countless friendly lives were saved by a laminated Russian 1:50 map, a five-cent grease pencil and a dedicated and professional … pilot with the experience and training to sift through the fog of both air and ground war,” the A-10 pilot wrote.

The ground troops and their air support regrouped. The B-1 crew plugged in fresh—and this time correct—GPS coordinates and dropped four 2,000-pound bombs on the fortress.

The two A-10s, their gas tanks full, angled in to cover the Apaches. “We set up a close, low escort pattern to provide immediate firepower in defense of the helicopters,” the pilot remembered.


As soon as they crossed the canal, all Hell broke loose from the canal banks and village. The Apaches began firing, we were calling out firing positions and shooting alongside them [via] close-range, low-angle strafe.

As I passed abeam one Apache, I glanced high left to see a man, leaning over the stubby helicopter wing, unloading his rifle on the enemy. We matched with 30-millimeter and rockets.
The B-1 held high as he was useless during this close attack phase. The Apaches, usually the escort birds, now found themselves requiring escort to make it in and out alive. Only an A-10 could have done that.
The Brits found Ford. He was already dead. The A-10s covered the Apaches on their return flight then helped the B-1 pulverize the fortress. “This time the JTAC had deferred coordinate generation to my flight lead.”

“Ever since this mission I have fully embraced the unique and highly specialized skill of battlefield tracking,” the pilot concluded. “It is a skill unique to the A-10 community, as we realize that [close air support] is more than simply dialing up a bomb for the ground commander.”

The A-10 fliers—plus some very traumatized Royal Marines and B-1 crew members—may realize that. But Air Force generals apparently do not. They persist in believing a B-1 can replace an A-10.

[polluelo]

Tendencioso a mas no poder. Desde luego que al que le ha pillado maldita la gracia que le hace pero las cosas no pueden presentarse de manera mas retorcida.

Para no complicarnos mucho un artículo de la wiki. Precisamente la mayoria de los incidentes con fuego amigo se producen con las armas mágicas que están mas cerca de tierra y con menor velocidad para poder identificar con mayor seguridad:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fr ... _incidents

[poliorcetes]

Creo que yerras el tiro. Además de que llamas tendencioso a lo que no te gusta, el núcleo del artículo es el entrenamiento del piloto, un factor que se suele olvidar... lo que no deja de resultar también significativo

Un piloto de A-10 desarrolla sus habilidades en todos los aspectos del CAS. En el artículo hemos visto un ejemplo de muchos. Un piloto de B-1 (o de F-35, que para el caso), lleva la bomba hasta la cesta de puntería que le permite la munición y lanza. No interviene personalmente.

Un piloto especializado y entrenado en CAS puede cometer errores. Vale. Pero también tiene un margen de reacción que no tiene un camionero

[polluelo]

No, es tendencioso porque se olvida de mencionar todas esas veces, la mayoria, en el que el supuesto mejor entrenamiento solo ha servido para que haya mayoria de casos de fuego amigo.

Es tendencioso porque termina diciendo que el B-1, no el entrenamiento o la estratégia seguida con ese modelo, no puede ser sustituido por el A-10, no por los pilotos de A-10 o su entrenamiento. Es tendencioso porque olvida comentar que los pilotos de A-10 hacen exactamente lo mismo que los pilotos de B-1, seguir las coordenadas que le mandan desde tierra y lanzar sin ver lo que hacen. Es tendencioso porque lo primero que hace es echarle la culpa de lo ocurrido al método seguido olvidando de manera casual que siguiendo el otro método también se han cometido errores, muchos mas. Es tendencioso porque si quisiera echarle la culpa al sistema de entrenamiento podria decir que con otras herramientas se puede tener el mismo entrenamiento especializado o mejor todavia.

¿Te parece poco tendencioso? Evidentemente no porque sigue diciendo lo mismo de siempre y de un caso, uno solo, monta toda una campaña. Si se hubieran seguido las directrices del artículo de retirar aquello que causa daños propios hace muchos años que el A-10 habria sido retirado, antes incluso que el B-1 hubiera soltado su primera bomba. Y si hacemos caso al meollo del artículo, que solo montado en el caballo mágico se puede hacer CAS de manera segura y efectiva porque solo en él se pueden concentrar entrenamiento y capacidad tendremos que llegar a la conclusión de que el único país del mundo capaz de cumplir esa misión son los Usa y el resto de paises solo buscan matar a sus propias tropas usando herramientas inservibles, peligrosas e incapaces de entrenar adecuadamente a sus pilotos. Claro que luego vemos a los franceses en Africa, por ejemplo, haciendo eso que no podrian hacer porque no tienen el arma mágica y sin matarse entre ellos y podriamos llegar a plantearnos ciertas preguntas incómodas.

[champi]

Ese artículo me recuerda a otro del mismo tipo pero al revés: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArch ... 4blue.aspx

...
A 900-page report prepared by the Air Force and Marine Corps lays out in detail how USAF A-10 attack aircraft came to strike a US Marine company on the fourth day of Gulf War II. Investigators determined that a ground-based Marine air controller, located south of USMC Charlie Company, called in the air strikes against his own forces. He mistakenly believed that his unit was farther north than any others. (See “Aerospace World: A-10 Pilots Cleared in Fratricide,” p. 16.)
...

Pues lo dicho, lo mismo pero al revés. Desgraciadamente el piloto esta vez no se enteró del error a pesar de llevar el pájaro CAS por excelencia. Precisamente por eso se desarrolló el "Blue force tracking system"...

En otro orden de cosas, el Scorpion ahora en gris bicolor: http://theaviationist.com/2014/06/17/sc ... ew-livery/


Y Jordania parece que va a convertir también un C-295 a cañonero: http://www.airbusmilitary.com/PressCent ... nship.aspx

Pues es una más de las numerosas versiones del pájaro: http://www.airbusmilitary.com/Aircraft/ ... About.aspx

...
The C295 is also available in an “Anti Submarine Warfare” (ASW) version and an Airborne Early Warning (AEW&C) and Control fitted with the IAI/ELTA 4th Generation Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar. Other C295 special versions are: Gunship (Close Air Support to ground troops, convoys, facilities, etc), Tactical Aerial Refuelling (to increase the radius of action for combat SAR or Special Ops helicopters) and SIGINT version.
...