Misiones CAS, COIN y contra objetivos de oportunidad

[poliorcetes]

Los marines no cometieron el error de key west, pero sí otros. El más grave, enamorarse demasiado y demasiado tiempo del concepto STOVL / VTOL, queriendo reeditar tarawa en un futuro indeterminado y sacrificando muchísimo para que eso suceda. Como al resto de los cuerpos americanos, el F-35 les está suponiendo un brutal coste para todos sus programas en plena era del secuestro presupuestario (restricción presupuestaria sería una traducción más adecuada a nuestro contexto español).

En una alternativa radical, podrían haber confiado en la Navy para proteger de amenazas aéreas (que en un futuro previsible no serán de gran entidad, dado que las fuerzas aéreas respetables pertenecen sin excepción a potencias nucleares), y centrarse en CAS y en menor medida en AI. Para ello, no necesitan un modelo multirrol, sino un modelo sencillo y económico que sea complementado por los helos y empleado cuando se necesita más apoyo y más rápido de lo que puede proporcionar un helo.

Probablemente, no sería necesario que fuera supersónico, sino que con un crucero subsónico mediano y económico sería más que suficiente. Como siempre, necesitaría persistencia de vuelo y gran capacidad de carga, acumulando un buen número de disparos para que la persistencia se tradujera en todo el apoyo que necesitaran los grunts en tierra.

No tengo claro si para eso bastaría con un turbohélice o si sería más apropiado un modelo dotado con dos turbofan actuales, de alta eficiencia. El rol del cañón no sería tan decisivo como en el A-10, pero las experiencias recientes han demostrado que sigue siendo viable y solvente.

En cuanto a Canadá, me parece una posición óptima. Se entiende la independencia de las Fuerzas Aéreas en un momento en el que fue necesario para que se desarrollaran, pero lo cierto es que en muchos países se desarrollaron 'demasiado', traicionando en la práctica (que no en el papel) el concepto de armas combinadas al centrarse en misiones más 'apropiadamente aéreas', como la defensa aérea, que no es decisiva desde hace décadas. Si he entendido bien el movimiento, la reunificación de ramas persigue independencias indeseadas e injustificables.

[poliorcetes]

Polluelo, la llevas clara: Chuck Norris quiere salvar el A-10. Se están rifando patadas voladoras para quien quiera retirarlo!

Chuck Norris Writes to Save the A-10 Warthog from Retirement
updated at 01:48 by news@military-inc.com(Bryant Jordan) via Defense Tech
Broadcasted by You at 11:18

si chuck norris quiere salvar el A-10, la cosa ya está clara
Edit
Chuck Norris wants to save the A-10 from retirement. (Courtesy of Chuck Norris)Air Force leaders wanting to send the A-10 Thunderbolt to the bone yard already have any number of lawmakers criticizing them from Capitol Hill.

Now they’ve got “Lone Wolf McQuade” coming after them.

Action star Chuck Norris – an Air Force veteran – on Monday delivered an editorial roundhouse kick to the Air Force, arguing on the World Net Daily website that the “Warthog” – as it is known – still has plenty of fight left in it.

In the ongoing campaign against ISIS, Norris writes, “the A-10's utility is warranted even more now than ever.”

“Its firepower capability, speed and accuracy, frequent war use, and the oft-painted teeth on its nose cone have made it one of the military’s most popular aircraft,” Norris wrote.

Norris said its “combination of large and varied ordnance load, long loiter time, accurate weapons delivery, austere field capability, and survivability has proven invaluable to the United States and its allies.”

Congress has been running interference against Pentagon plans to dump the plane, saving it through 2015 with $635 million drawn from the war funding budget. But the Air Force has made clear it wants to begin retiring the Thunderbolt fleet next year, linking the move to paying for the development of the Joint Strike Fighter.

In his column, Norris throws some jabs at Warthog critics, including Air Combat Command Commander Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, who is quoted as saying: “There’s only so much you can get out of that airplane. Those airplanes are gonna wear out.”

“But that statement is true of every airplane in existence, and even the sun!” Norris wrote. “The question is: Is the fleet of A-10 ready for retirement? I just celebrated my 75th birthday, but I’m nowhere near ready to head to the scrapheap. Some things improve with age, and the A-10 has done just that, too.”

Norris, a martial arts world champion who began training while in the Air Force in the late 1950s, has achieved almost folk legend status — portrayed as someone who can never be defeated and capable of bending man and nature to his will and fists.

The martial arts superstar has gained further recent fame with an influx of comedic one-liners about his perceived super powers such as — “Chuck Norris died 20 years ago, Death just hasn’t built up the courage to tell him yet,” or “Chuck Norris and Superman once fought each other on a bet. The loser had to start wearing his underwear on the outside of his pants.”

To further bring attention to and save the A-10, Norris is producing and selling a T-shirt with the words “Save the A-10” on the front, and on the back, “Chuck Norris’ First Born Son was a Warthog. He cried tears of ‘BRRRRRRRRRRRTTTTT.”

All proceeds from the T-shirt sales will go toward his martial arts charity, Kickstart Kids.

– Bryant Jordan can be reached at Bryant.Jordan@military.com

[MedalOfHorror]

Venía a poner justamente eso

[poliorcetes]

Los anti A-10 están perdidos

[poliorcetes]

Un artículo con graves acusaciones contra el alto mando de la USAF

Antes de despreciarlo por incluirse en un blog, sugiero se tenga en cuenta su autoría.

Y finalmente... sin cielo despejado y con sistemas anti-GPS, los teen no van a ser unas plataformas CAS ni siquiera razonables, comparadas con lo que tiene ahora la USAF

U.S. Air Force Pilots Said Retiring the A-10 Will Put Troops in Danger



The flying branch whitewashed their concerns

by MANDY SMITHBERGER

“I can’t wait to be relieved of the burdens of close air support,” Maj. Gen. James Post, the vice commander of Air Combat Command, allegedly told a collection of officers at a training session in August 2014.

As with his now notorious warning that service members would be committing treason if they communicated with Congress about the successes of the A-10 Warthog, Post seems to speak for the id of Air Force headquarters’ true hostility towards the close air support mission.

Air Force four-stars are working hard to deny this hostility to the public and Congress, but their abhorrence of the mission has been demonstrated through 70 years of Air Force headquarters’ budget decisions and combat actions that have consistently short-changed close air support.


For the third year in a row, the Air Force has proposed retiring some or all of the A-10s, ostensibly to save money in order to pay for “modernization.”

After failing to convince Congress to implement their plan last year?—?except for a last minute partial capitulation by retiring Senate and House Armed Services Committee chairmen Sen. Carl Levin and Rep. Buck McKeon?—?and encountering uncompromising pushback this year, Air Force headquarters has renewed its campaign with more dirty tricks.

First, Air Force headquarters tried to fight back against congressional skepticism by releasing cherry-picked data purporting to show that the A-10 kills more friendlies and civilians than any other U.S. Air Force plane, even though it actually has one of the lowest fratricide and civilian casualty rates.

With those cooked statistics debunked and rejected by Senate Armed Services Chairman Sen. John McCain, Air Force headquarters hastily assembled a joint CAS “summit” to try to justify dumping the A-10.


Above?—?an A-10 Warthog drops a training bomb in New Jersey on Dec. 18, 2014. Air National Guard photo. At top?—?an A-10 fires off a flare above Arkansas on June 4, 2013. Air Force photo
Notes and documents from the summit meetings, now widely available throughout the Air Force and shared with the Project On Government Oversight’s Center for Defense Information, reveal that the recommendations of the summit working groups were altered by senior Air Force leaders to quash any joint service or congressional concerns about the coming gaps in CAS capabilities.

Air Force headquarters needed this whitewash to pursue, yet again, its anti-A-10 crusade without congressional or internal-Pentagon opposition.

The current A-10 divestment campaign, led by Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh, is only one in a long chain of Air Force headquarters’ attempts by bomber-minded Air Force generals to get rid of the A-10 and the CAS mission.

The efforts goes as far back as when the A-10 concept was being designed in the Pentagon, following the unfortunate, bloody lessons learned from the Vietnam War. For example, there was a failed attempt in late-1980s to kill off the A-10 by proposing to replace it with a supposedly CAS-capable version of the F-16?—?the A-16.

Air Force headquarters tried to keep the A-10s out of the first Gulf War in 1990, except for contingencies. A token number was eventually brought in at the insistence of the theater commander, and the A-10 so vastly outperformed the A-16s that the entire A-16 effort was dismantled.

As a reward for these A-10 combat successes, Air Force headquarters tried to starve the program by refusing to give the A-10 any funds for major modifications or programmed depot maintenance during the 1990s. After additional combat successes in the Iraq War, the Air Force then attempted to unload the A-10 fleet in 2004.

To ground troops and the pilots who perform the mission, the A-10 and the CAS mission are essential and crucial components of American air power.

The A-10 saves so many troop lives because it is the only platform with the unique capabilities necessary for effective CAS?—?highly maneuverable at low speeds, unmatched survivability under ground fire, a longer loiter time, able to fly more sorties per day that last longer and more lethal cannon passes than any other fighter.

These capabilities make the A-10 particularly superior in getting in close enough to support our troops fighting in narrow valleys, under bad weather, toe-to-toe with close-in enemies and/or facing fast-moving targets. For these reasons, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno has called the A-10 “the best close air support aircraft.”

Other Air Force platforms can perform parts of the mission, though not as well?—?and none can do all of it. Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed the troops’ combat experience in a recent Senate Armed Services committee hearing?—?“It’s ugly, it’s loud, but when it comes in … it just makes a difference.”


A-10 attack runs in Grafenwoehr, Germany on May 20, 2014. Army photos


In 2014, Congress was well on the way to roundly rejecting the Air Force headquarters’ efforts to retire the entire fleet of 350 A-10s. It was a strong, bipartisan demonstration of support for the CAS platform in all four of Congress’s annual defense bills.

But in the final days of the 113th Congress, a “compromise” heavily pushed by the Air Force was tucked into the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015.

The “compromise” allowed the Air Force to move A-10s into virtually retired “backup status” as long as the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office in DoD certified that the measure was the only option available to protect readiness.

CAPE, now led by former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller Jamie Morin, duly issued that assessment?—?though in classified form, thus making it unavailable to the public. In one of his final acts as secretary of defense, Chuck Hagel then approved moving 18 A-10s to backup status.

The Air Force intends to replace the A-10 with the F-35. But despite spending nearly $100 billion and 14 years in development, the plane is still a minimum of six years away from being certified ready for any real?—?but still extremely limited?—?form of CAS combat.

The A-10, on the other hand, is continuing to perform daily with striking effectiveness in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria?—?at the insistence of the CENTCOM commander and despite previous false claims from the Air Force that A-10s can’t be sent to Syria.

A-10s have also recently been sent to Europe to be available for contingencies in Ukraine?—?at the insistence of the EUCOM commander.

These demands from active theaters are embarrassing and compelling counterarguments to the Air Force’s plea that the Warthog is no longer relevant or capable and needs to be unloaded to help pay for the new, expensive, more high-tech planes that Air Force headquarters vastly prefers?—?even though the planes are under-performing.

So far, Congress has not been any more sympathetic to this year’s continuation of Welsh’s campaign to retire the A-10.

McCain rejected the Air Force’s contention that the F-35 was ready enough to be a real replacement for the A-10 and vowed to reverse the A-10 retirement process already underway. Ayotte led a letter to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter with senators Tom Cotton, Lindsey Graham, Thom Tillis, Roger Wicker, Mike Crapo, Johnny Isakson and Richard Burr rebuking Hagel’s decision to place 18 A-10s in backup inventory.

Specifically, the senators called the decision a “back-door” divestment approved by a “disappointing rubber stamp” that guts “the readiness of our nation’s best close air support aircraft.”

In the House, Rep. Martha McSally wrote to Carter stating that she knew from her own experience as a former A-10 pilot and 354th Fighter Squadron commander that the A-10 is uniquely capable for combat search and rescue missions, in addition to CAS, and that the retirement of the A-10 through a classified assessment violated the intent of Congress’ compromise with the Air Force.

The classification of the explanation for cutting the most effective close air support platform flies against the open nature of our government. The public has a right to review the analytic methods used, the alternatives assessed, and any competing recommendations. Otherwise, it is reasonable to conclude the “rubber stamp” nature of the classified report is simply a backdoor attempt at divestment.

Some in the press have been similarly skeptical of the Air Force’s intentions, saying that the plan “doesn’t add up,” and more colorfully, calling it “total bullshit and both the American taxpayer and those who bravely fight our wars on the ground should be furious.”

Those reports similarly cite the Air Force’s longstanding antagonism to the CAS mission as the chief motive for the A-10’s retirement.


U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. James Post, vice commander of Air Combat Command, at Langley Air Force Base on Nov. 4, 2014. Air Force photo
Sham summit

By announcing that pilots who spoke to Congress about the A-10 were “committing treason,” Post?—?ACC’s vice commander?—?sparked an Inspector General investigation and calls for his resignation from POGO and other whistleblower and taxpayer groups.

That public relations debacle made it clear that the Air Force needed a new campaign strategy to support its faltering A-10 divestment campaign.

On the orders of the Air Force’s chief of staff, Air Combat Command chief Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle promptly announced a joint CAS summit, allegedly to determine the future of CAS.

It was not the first CAS summit to be held?—?the most recent previous summit was held in 2009?—?but it was the first to receive so much fanfare. As advertised, the purpose of the summit was to determine and then mitigate any upcoming risks and gaps in CAS mission capabilities.

But notes, documents and annotated briefing slides reviewed by CDI reveal that what the Air Force publicly released from the summit is nothing more than a white-washed assessment of the true and substantial operational risks of retiring the A-10.

Just prior to the summit, a working group of approximately 40 people, including CAS-experienced Air Force service members, met for three days at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base to identify potential risks and shortfalls in CAS capabilities.

But Air Force headquarters gave them two highly restrictive ground rules?—?first, assume the A-10s are completely divested, with no partial divestments to be considered. Second, assume the F-35 is fully CAS capable by 2021?—?an ambitious assumption at best.

The working groups included A-10 pilots, F-16 pilots and joint terminal attack controllers?—?all with combat-based knowledge of the CAS platforms and their shortfalls and risks.

They summarized their findings with slides stating that the divestment would “cause significant CAS capability and capacity gaps for 10 to 12 years,” create training shortfalls, increase costs per flying hour and sideline over 200 CAS-experienced pilots due to lack of cockpits for them.

Additionally, they found that after the retirement of the A-10, there would be “very limited” CAS capability at low altitudes and in poor weather, “very limited” armor killing capability and “very limited” ability to operate in a GPS-denied environment.

Most experts anticipate GPS denial when fighting technically competent enemies with jamming technology?—?an environment that deprives the non-A-10 platforms of their most important CAS-guided munition.

They also concluded that even the best mitigation plans they were recommending would not be sufficient to overcome these problems, and that significant life-threatening shortfalls would remain.

Carlisle was briefed at Davis-Monthan on these incurable risks and gaps that A-10 divestment would cause. Workshop attendees noted that he understood gaps in capability created by retiring the A-10 could not be solved with the options currently in place. Carlisle was also briefed on the results of the second task to develop a list of requirements and capabilities for a new A-X CAS aircraft that could succeed the A-10.

“These requirements look a lot like the A-10, what are we doing here?” he asked. The slides describing the new A-X requirements disappeared from subsequent Pentagon summit presentations and were never mentioned in any of the press releases describing the summit.


At the four-day Pentagon summit the next week, Col. James P. Meger?—?the commander of the 355th Fighter Wing?—?briefed lower-level joint representatives from the Army and the Marine Corps about the risks identified by the group at Davis-Monthan.

Included in the briefing was the prediction that divestment of the A-10 would result in “significant capability and capacity gaps for the next 10 to 12 years” that would require maintaining legacy aircraft until the F-35A was fully operational.

After the presentation, an Army civilian representative became concerned. The slides, he told Meger, suggested that the operational dangers of divestment of the A-10 were much greater than had been previously portrayed by the Air Force.

Meger attempted to reassure the civilian that the mitigation plan would eliminate the risks. Following the briefing, Meger met with Lt. Gen. Tod Wolters, the deputy chief of staff for operations at the Air Force’s headquarters in Washington.

Notably, the summit slide presentation for general officers the next day stripped away any mention of A-10 divestment creating significant capability gaps. Any mention of the need to maintain legacy aircraft, including the A-10, until the F-35A reached full operating capability was also removed from the presentation.

The next day, Meger delivered the new, sanitized presentation to the Air Force chief of staff. There was only muted mention of the risks presented by divestment.

There was no mention of the 10- to 12-year estimated capability gap, nor was there any mention whatsoever of the need to maintain legacy aircraft?—?such as the A-10 or less capable alternatives like the F-16 or F-15E?—?until the F-35A reached FOC.

Other important areas of concern to working group members, but impossible to adequately address within the three days at Davis-Monthan, were the additional costs to convert squadrons from the A-10 to another platform?—?the inevitable training shortfalls that would be created?—?and how the deployment tempos of ongoing operations would further exacerbate near-term gaps in CAS capability.

To our knowledge, none of these concerns surfaced during any part of the Pentagon summit.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 6, 2014. Army National Guard photo
Congress must challenge the generals

Inevitably, the Air Force generals leading the ongoing CAS summit media blitz will point congressional Armed Services and Appropriations committees to the whitewashed results of their sham summit.

When they do, senators and representatives who care about the lives of American troops in combat need to ask the generals the following questions.

Why wasn’t this summit held before the Air Force decided to get rid of A-10s?
Why doesn’t the Air Force’s joint CAS summit include any statement of needs from soldiers or Marines who have actually required close air support in combat?
What is the Air Force’s contingency plan for minimizing casualties among our troops in combat in the years after 2019, if the F-35 is several years late in achieving its full CAS capabilities?
When and how does the Air Force propose to test whether the F-35 can deliver close support at least as combat-effective as the A-10’s present capability? How can that test take place without A-10s?
Congress cannot and should not endorse Air Force leadership’s summit by divesting the A-10s. Instead, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees need to hold hearings that consider the real and looming problems of inadequate close support, the very problems that Air Force headquarters prevented their summit from addressing.

These hearings need to include a close analysis of CAPE’s assessment and whether the decision to classify its report was necessary and appropriate.

Most importantly, those hearings must include combat-experienced receivers and providers of close support who have seen the best and worst of that support, not witnesses cherry-picked by Air Force leadership?—?and the witnesses invited must be free to tell it the way they saw it.

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If Congress is persuaded by the significant CAS capability risks and gaps originally identified by the summit’s working groups, they should write and enforce legislation to constrain the Air Force from further eroding the nation’s close air support forces.

Finally, if Congress believes that officers have purposely misled them about the true nature of these risks, or attempted to constrain service members’ communications with Congress about those risks, they should hold the officers accountable and remove them from positions of leadership.

Congress owes nothing less to the troops they send to fight our wars.

Mandy Smithberger is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight, where this article originally appeared.

[Orel]

Y finalmente... sin cielo despejado y con sistemas anti-GPS, los teen no van a ser unas plataformas CAS ni siquiera razonables, comparadas con lo que tiene ahora la USAF

Additionally, they found that after the retirement of the A-10, there would be “very limited” CAS capability at low altitudes and in poor weather, “very limited” armor killing capability and “very limited” ability to operate in a GPS-denied environment.

Most experts anticipate GPS denial when fighting technically competent enemies with jamming technology?—?an environment that deprives the non-A-10 platforms of their most important CAS-guided munition.

Poli, eso que cito es un despropósito como una casa. Quien lo haya escrito la ha cagado pero bien. Si hay un caza que es de cielo despejado y que no actúa con mal tiempo es el A-10. Pregúntale a los soldados que salvaron F-15E y F-16 donde los A-10 no podían actuar por tormenta.

Capacidad de destrucción de blindados muy limitada... claro, seguro que va mejor un cañón de 30 mm a tiro de AAA y MANPADs que una bomba general (no especial ni nada) de 150 kg cayendo a 600 km/h que tumba cualquier blindado.

Y en cuanto al GPS otra perla: el A-10 también usa GPS para navegar y como guía de armas. Si anulan el GPS, el A-10 también pierde mucha capacidad, de hecho más que los demás que, aparte de inerciales y otros, también tienen radar para hacer seguimiento del terreno, búsqueda de objetivos...
Y vamos, que baje Dios y lea que el arma CAS más importante de los cazas "no A-10" es la JDAM... ¿y las Paveway de toda la vida de guía láser? ¿Y las EPaveway, LJDAM y SDB de doble guía? Que son precisamente las que se están generalizando. Porque si alguien lo olvida, para atacar objetivos CAS hay que contar a menudo con blancos móviles... y contra esos no sirven las GPS, tienen que ser láser (o IR/TV).

Chao

[poliorcetes]

si hay verdadero mal tiempo, el CAS se limita incluso con GPS. recuerda que tiene que haber un FAC en el suelo para asegurar que no hay ninguna cagada

El radar mapea el terreno, si. Pero para determinar posiciones de blancos en suelo necesitas algo de la capacidad de JSTARS

En entornos de negación parcial de GPS, vuelve a funcionar lo antiguo. El entrenamiento ante todo, y después lo que pueda aportar el propio avión. Quedan las municiones de guía láser, claro, pero llega un momento en el que lo único en número suficiente son JDAM o bombas "tontas". Y precisamente en ese entorno el cañón recupera aún más importancia, debido a que permite un apoyo a una cercanía inimaginable para una bomba no guiada.

Claro que hay munición láser. ¿De qué precio? ¿Con qué stocks?

De todas maneras, lo que más importa es el hombre, su entrenamiento y la doctrina de su unidad. Cortar el A-10 (10?) años antes de que el F-35 esté plenamente operativo lleva a una situación de A-16 sin cañón: un aparato mucho menos apropiado para las misiones CAS en los parámetros que más importan, y hasta inapropiado para apoyo CSAR

Si fuera la primera vez que la USAF se trata de cargar el A-10, creería algo en su sinceridad. Estaría en desacuerdo, pero les daría el beneficio de la duda. Pero después de tantos intentos, no pueden contar con el beneficio de la duda.

Lo que no comentas del artículo (y no te culpo, sé que estás muy liado) son las durísimas acusaciones sobre falseamiento de datos sobre víctimas por fuego amigo, coste por hora de vuelo, etc. Si alguna duda quedaba sobre la limpieza de las intenciones de los generales de azul, se viene abajo con esas prácticas tan chungas. No es sólo que el F-35 se esté fumigando el presupuesto: es que, realmente, se quieren cargar el A-10 e incumplir en la práctica su parte de Key West.

"I cant wait to be relieved of the burdens of close air support"

As with his now notorious warning that service members would be committing treason if they communicated with Congress about the successes of the A-10 Warthog, Post seems to speak for the id of Air Force headquarters’ true hostility towards the close air support mission.

First, Air Force headquarters tried to fight back against congressional skepticism by releasing cherry-picked data purporting to show that the A-10 kills more friendlies and civilians than any other U.S. Air Force plane, even though it actually has one of the lowest fratricide and civilian casualty rates.

With those cooked statistics debunked and rejected by Senate Armed Services Chairman Sen. John McCain, Air Force headquarters hastily assembled a joint CAS “summit” to try to justify dumping the A-10.

Some in the press have been similarly skeptical of the Air Force’s intentions, saying that the plan “doesn’t add up,” and more colorfully, calling it “total bullshit and both the American taxpayer and those who bravely fight our wars on the ground should be furious.”

Those reports similarly cite the Air Force’s longstanding antagonism to the CAS mission as the chief motive for the A-10’s retirement.

By announcing that pilots who spoke to Congress about the A-10 were “committing treason,” Post?—?ACC’s vice commander?—?sparked an Inspector General investigation and calls for his resignation from POGO and other whistleblower and taxpayer groups.

[alejandro_]

Yo francamente no sé cómo se puede retirar completamente un avión que acaba de pasar por una modernización y para el que debería haber cientos de repuestos. Creo que la unificación de sistemas se está llevando al extremo. De hecho hay voces que piensan que el F-35 debería haber sido desarrollado en una version embarcada/terrestre, diseñando otro avión STOVL.

Saludos.

[poliorcetes]

Es evidente a estas alturas que es una excusa. No es una decisión racional y optimizada. USAF tiene un problema jodido con el CAS

[Orel]

Lo que no comentas del artículo (y no te culpo, sé que estás muy liado) son las durísimas acusaciones sobre falseamiento de datos sobre víctimas por fuego amigo, coste por hora de vuelo, etc. Si alguna duda quedaba sobre la limpieza de las intenciones de los generales de azul, se viene abajo con esas prácticas tan chungas. No es sólo que el F-35 se esté fumigando el presupuesto: es que, realmente, se quieren cargar el A-10 e incumplir en la práctica su parte de Key West.

Pues no, no tengo tanto tiempo como antes, sin parar de viajar y responsable de proyecto en el que acabo de caer, pues "liao". No sabía eso.

Pero aquí hay errores de tipo técnico que llevan a malinterpretar utilidad e inutilidades:

si hay verdadero mal tiempo, el CAS se limita incluso con GPS.

Pero en esas condiciones sin GPS ni radar, como un A-10, no es que estés limitado, es que no haces nada de nada, mientras que un Teen cualquiera puede operar con éxito aceptable.

El radar mapea el terreno, si. Pero para determinar posiciones de blancos en suelo necesitas algo de la capacidad de JSTARS

En absoluto, Poli Los radares de los cazas multirol hace mucho tiempo que detectan blancos de superficie incluyendo tamaño vehículos. Y con los años los radares actuales más capaces detectan aún a más distancia y con más resolución. Y te hacen un mapeo SAR que te quedas flipado, que no es sólo del terreno incluye blancos. Y no es sólo eso, es que un caza no puede volar bajo con mal tiempo sin radar porque no vé los obstáculos (montañas...).
Sin radar ni eres todotiempo ni eres multirol ni puedes volar con seguridad bajo, sólo puedes apoyar a las tropas cuando hace bueno... y el enemigo está controlado.

Que conste que no soy en concreto "anti-A10" ni tampoco "pro-F-35 para CAS", se trata de que no estoy a favor de cazas ultraespecializados. Muchísimo más ultraespecializados que un Raptor en AA o un Tornado en AS, como ya dije, porque esos al menos realizan todas las tareas de su campo en todo escenario, mientras que el A-10 sólo un par de tareas de tooodas las AS y con buen tiempo y amenaza controlada. Me parece aberrante, un derroche de dinero y medios.

Según esa idea tenemos que volver a tener cazas ultraespecializados en AA, en ataque antibuque, en interdición, en CAS... ¿Porqué sólo para CAS, Poli? ¿Y por qué esa idea de Guera Fría sí vale y otras no?

Un saludo

[poliorcetes]

El CAS no es guerra fría. Es primera guerra mundial, y la misión de ataque principal desde hace décadas

Enviado desde mi SM-N910F mediante Tapatalk

[Orel]

El CAS no es guerra fría.

Pero el A-10 sí No hablamos de la tarea si no del medio para cumplirla. Es que si no, también es primera guerra mundial toda misión AA y AS.

y la misión de ataque principal desde hace décadas

No. Esa idea viene de Iraq y Astán este siglo, pero si hablas de "décadas" en guerras como Libia '86, Iraq '91, Bosnia/Kosovo en los '90, Iraq '98, Iraq '03, Libia '11, no era la misión principal. Ahí estaban las SEAD/DEAD y las de interdicción contra centros de mando, bases aéreas, cuarteles, ministerios... eso que hace que el enemigo se quede descabezado y que permite hacer CAS con garantías e invasión terrestre si la hay.


- Aparte, vuelven a hablar del engendro Advanced High-performance Reconnaissance Light Aircraft (AHRLAC) surafricano:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/new-att ... -expansion
http://www.airforce-technology.com/proj ... ft-ahrlac/

[poliorcetes]

No es correcto. El A-10 deriva de las experiencias con el A-1 en Vietnam. Cierto es que tendría un desempeño en la defensa AT que nunca tuvo que usarse, pero se ha empleado en todos los teatros de operaciones desde el final de la guerra fría y con gran efecto. De hecho, si tiene sustitutos en una misión imposible (defensa AT), no tiene sustituto en CSAR.

Hoy en día nadie va a volver a ofrecer un blanco tan tremendo como el desgraciado ejército iraquí de Saddam. No hay ni un sólo país potencialmente enemigo y no nuclear que disponga de algo ni remotamente parecido a las defensas SA y AA de Iraq, y precisamente la lección de esa campaña fue "es inútil plantar cara frontalmente a la OTAN"

Ningún país no nuclear. Y a la potencia nuclear que sea, no le hace falta.

No desdeño la AI. Se seguirá haciendo puntualmente. Pero precisamente los ejemplos que comentas han demostrado a quien quiere aprender las lecciones que no hay nada que hacer como Estado cuando la OTAN se pone a trabajar. Precisamente tenemos vectores y sistemas listos para algo así, que no tenemos que emplear desde Kosovo (Iraq 03 no tuvo gran componente AI desde el 93, y Libia, para desgracia de todos, fue una campaña incompleta y mal planificada, como estamos viendo).

Lo que me parece absurdo es negar que la misión CAS es la reina absoluta desde la caída del Pacto de Varsovia. Hay momentos puntuales que TAMBIÉN se procede a AI, y en el futuro SEAD es muy improbable. Pero un día tras otro se está golpeando a enemigos no estatales en CAS

[champi]

El problema del A-10, Su-25 y demás plataformas optimizadas para el vueo a baja cota es la proliferación de los MANPADs. Recordemos la pobre actuación de los Su-25 en Ucrania, los A-10 que no se atreven a volar en Siria (justo donde los Reaper vuelan cientos de horas); y en Irak ya se han perdido varios Su-25s por varias causas. Algo al respecto, de la revista Air Combat:

...
Iraqi ‘Frogfoot’ saga

On June 28, 2014, two Su-25SMs were urgently delivered to the Iraqi Air Force from Russia. They arrived at Al Muthana AB aboard an An-124 transport. These jets were second-hand aircraft from the 412th Aviation Base at Domna in Zabaykalsky Krai. They had once been based in East Germany and had then served with the 899th Aviation Regiment at Buturlinovka. The aircraft were hastily repaired and re-painted in IQAF colors. Three others (serials 2519, 2520 and 2521) arrived in the next few days and were deployed to Al Ali AB, where they were to be returned to fl ying condition by technicians of the 121st ARZ.

Three of the seven Su-25s operational with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Air and Space Force (IRGCASF) arrived in Baghdad on July 1, 2014 under the cover of night. These comprised serial 15-2459 (a Su-25UBKM delivered to the IRGCASF by Ulan-Ude in January 2013), serial 15-2451 (a Su-25KM upgraded and modernized by Pars Aviation’s MRO center in 2011) and serial 15-2456 (an ex-Iraqi Su-25K modernized to Su-25KM standard in 2012). These aircraft were piloted by two Iraqi and two Iranian crews who left Mehrabad International Airport and staged via Ilam Airport in Iran. They seem to have arrived at Ilam on June 18, where Iraqi pilots conducted several training flights before they departed for Al Rashid AB in Iraq. The last four examples of the ‘Frogfoot’, Su-25KMs serials 15-2450 and 15-2454 (ex-Iraqi) and Su-25UBKMs 15-2458 and 15-2457, arrived at Al Rashid the following day.

Former Iranian Su-25s performed several combat missions against targets in Iraq’s northern province of Nineveh on July 3. Two days afterwards, Iranian Col Shoja’at Alamdari Mourjani was killed on the ground in Samarra, north of Baghdad, by mortar fire. It remains uncertain whether he was simply an instructor, a strike co-ordinator or if he even completed combat missions himself.

In early August, the Su-25s were engaged in Mosul in northern Iraq. Around the 12th of that month, an Iraqi pilot, Col Jalil al-Awadi, was killed during take-off from Al Muthana, flying a Su-25UBKM. Some time in August or September, according to Iranian sources, a Su-25KM made an emergency landing after being hit by a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) around Kirkuk. The aircraft was badly damaged and taken out of active service, but the pilot was unharmed. On October 21, according to the Iraqi Defense Ministry, a Su-25SM made an emergency landing due to a technical problem near Saladin, but this time the jet was able to fl y again.

By early November, a Su-25 had returned to Iran, arriving at the IRGCASF air base at Seyyed al-Shohada. It was followed a few days later by two Su-25UBKMs, which entered the Pars Aviation MRO center in Tehran for technical inspection. The aircraft retained their Iraqi roundels.
...

Por eso ahora mismo los Su-25 ya no vuelan a baja cota sobre Ucrania, lo cual los hace muy poco útiles. De Air International:

...
After sustaining these losses over three months of combat flying, the depleted Su-25 force conducted further sporadic attack missions, mostly from medium altitude – above 16,400ft (5,000m) and beyond MANPAD engagement zones. Weapon delivery accuracy from such altitude is reduced noticeably. By the end of July, the UkAF continued using about ten Su-25s, but in a very careful and ineffective manner. On August 26, a four-ship of Frogfootswas seen on amateur video footage attacking separatist positions near Pervomaysk, some 20km (11nm) from the border with Russia. This time the Frogfootsflew at relatively high altitude, maintaining high speed, dispensing protective flares and dropping light-and-heatemitting bombs, which slowly descended on parachutes, as decoys for the infrared seeker heads of insurgent-launched MANPADS.

Another Su-25 – representing the sixth confirmed UkAF Frogfootloss in the conflict – was brought down near Starobeshevo on August 29, despite the precautions. Its pilot, Capt Vladislav Voloshin, managed to eject safely and was recovered by friendly troops. The separatists made three more claims for Su-25s destroyed that day. There was no confirmation from Ukrainian sources, or by any other credible evidence, such as photographic or video footage of wreckage. Four, may be five, of the owned Frogfootswere upgraded Su-25M1s versions fitted with better navigation and sighting equipment. At least two more sustained combat damage but were able to return to base.
...

Así que tenemos que el Frogfoot tiene que volar como un cazabombardero, y sin munición de precisión es prácticamente inútil.

Y respecto a lo que comentas de las misiones CAS, AI y SEAD, de Air Forces Monthly:

Deliberate Force
This was a NATO air campaign own from August 30 to September 20, 1995 by 400 NATO aircraft intended to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to return to peace talks. A total of 3,515 sorties were completed of which 2,000 were strike and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), own against a medium threat air defence environment. In all, 1,026 weapons were delivered on 338 targets, 67% of which were PGMs. One French Mirage 2000 was lost to a SAM but the air operations supported a return to the Dayton Peace accords.

Allied Force
A second NATO air operation was own March 23 to June 10, 1999 to halt Serbian atrocities and allow deployment of peace keeping forces. More than 1,000 NATO aircraft flew 38,000 sorties, including 10,484 strike missions and hit 990 positions. Some 14,000 weapons were dropped, often in poor weather, 29% of which were PGMs. A major SEAD effort was required to suppress the medium threat air defences. However, an F-117 and F-16 were lost to SAMs and the air defences were still firing back. This conflict saw the first use of JDAM, JSOW, AGM-130 and wide employment of UAVs for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Iraq – Operation Northern/Southern Watch
More than 100,000 sorties were flown from 1992 to 2003 by US, UK, French and other NATO forces to enforce the UN mandated no-fly zones. This operation evolved into a duel between US and UK airpower and Iraq air defences, and it became a virtual testing ground for strike and SEAD operations.

Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom
Less than a month after 9/11, US and coalition airpower was striking at the Taliban government in Afghanistan. More than 20,000 weapons, 51% of which were PGMs were delivered during this 176-day campaign. Air surveillance and precision air attacks assisted Northern Alliance, other Afghan militias and special operations forces in pushing out the Taliban and opening the way for coalition forces. Lessons showed the importance of naval airpower, bombers, refuelling tankers, airlift, networked operations, ISR, special forces, and PGMs.

Phase II involved ongoing air support for the coalition operation running from 2001 to 2015. Air forces gained experience flying together over Afghanistan and became familiar with the NATO standard systems and most were equipped with critical connective systems such as Link-16, secure radios, targeting pods and ROVER computer terminals and PGMs.

Iraq – Operation Iraqi Freedom
Phase 1 lasted from March 19 to May 1, 2003 with the strategic air campaign focused on an effects-based operations designed to disrupt Iraq’s command and control and shape the battlefield for a ground assault. The US achieved a high level of awareness with satellites, 80 ISR aircraft; ten types of UAVs and ‘tacair’ with FLIR pods all providing good connectivity. The coalition deployed 1,800 aircraft and flew 41,404 sorties, delivering 19,948 PGMs and 9,251 unguided weapons (68% PGMs to pave the way for the ground assault. Seven aircraft were lost in combat including one A-10 and six attack helicopters and 13 due to accidents. Weapons firsts included B-2s delivering Mk-82s, B-52 self lasing for LGBs, F-14Ds delivering JDAM, Tornado firing the Storm Shadow, the use of the CBU-105 sensor fused weapon and AGM-86D CALCM hard target penetrator.

Phase II lasted from late 2003-2010, with hundreds of thousands of sorties flown by a wide variety of platforms from B-52s, B-1s, F-15Es, F-16s, F/A-18s, AC-130s, and other platforms with a primary emphasis on providing battlefield awareness and close air support.

Operation Unified Protector
When Libya erupted into civil war, the UN passed Resolution 1970. The air campaign that followed ran March 19 to October 31, 2011. NATO air units supported by jets from Sweden, United Arab Emirates and Qatar flew 26,320 missions of which 9,653 were strike sorties. A wide range of munitions, ranging from cannon fire to LGBs and Storm Shadow cruise missiles were used. Most fighters were equipped with some form of FLIR/laser targeting pod and PGMs including LGBs, JDAMs, Maverick, Brimstone and the French Sagem SBU-38 Hammer AASM (Armement Air-Sol Modulaire). Shortfalls identified included a need for improved ISR data plus smaller, longer range munitions to hit selective targets with reduced danger of collateral damage.

Operation Inherent Resolve
In response to the dramatic success of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq during mid-2014, a coalition of nations was formed to ‘disrupt and destroy’ this expanding threat. Air units from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, the US, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have been flying strike sorties over Syria and Iraq. From August 8, 2014 airpower has been hitting ISIL targets but the sortie build up was slow. While many positions in Syria and Iraq have been destroyed and some ground assaults disrupted, results have been mixed. With no Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) on the front line, they must rely on UAVs, data and ‘friendly forces’ for intelligence and damage assessments. The full range of tactical PGMs have been employed with a noted emphasis on laser Mavericks and Brimstone which are useful against mobile targets.

Viendo estos números no parece que la AI sea algo puntual, sino más bien la norma...

[poliorcetes]

Lo cierto es que aquí tenemos un problema de definición. AI era, el siglo pasado, alcanzar a blancos estratégicos tras la línea del frente, ya fuera C3I, estratégicos o lo que fuera. A mí me parece que lo que se ha hecho en Siria e Iraq no es AI, pero honestamente tampoco se apoya a nadie propio. En algunos casos es CAS para los kurdos, pero en otros... qué?

Posiblemente la plataforma perfecta para la AI fuera el A-6 de la navy. Lo digo por centrar el tiro