Más sobre CAS y el A-10. En este caso un artículo de Combat Aircraft, más benevolente con el Warthog:
report: Ken Neubeck
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The more recent operations in Iraq against the so-called Islamic State (IS) militants understandably drew calls for A-10s to be deployed. Tackling small, fleeting targets surely fell right into the A-10’s remit? However, the USAF was understandably hesitant to send the type in. The ‘Hog’ flies lower and slower than other ‘fast air’ assets in the area, and the SAM threat was initially unclear. Indeed, the Iraqi Air Force had suffered at the hands of militants with manportable air defense systems (MANPADS).
The USAF announced last September that the 122nd Fighter Wing, Indiana ANG would deploy 12 aircraft to the US Central Command region in October, initially for missions in Afghanistan. However, by November it became clear that these A-10Cs would move to Kuwait to join the Iraq missions being conducted as part of Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’. This may have been due to the fact that the MANPADS threat was lower than envisaged, that fewer ground targets were being hit, and that smaller tactical targets needed to be addressed by an aircraft like the A-10.
Details of the A-10’s participation and effectiveness have been scarce. Action against IS has actually been reported in Iraqi news services, where the A-10 is referred to as the ‘wild boar’. A batch of statistics reported that the A-10 had been in more than 11 per cent of the missions against IS, although it clearly came late to the operations.
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Como puede leerse otra vez, si hay amenaza seria de MANPADs, el A-10 se queda en casa.
El artículo no lo pone, pero precisamente por eso en Siria parece que sigue sin volar. En marzo se desplegaron 6 unidades en Catar pero sólo para participar en tres ejercicios:
http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/mili ... /24640149/Y sobre la última operación de Israel sobre Gaza, parece que no se anduvieron con chiquitas. JDAMs de 2.000lb cayendo a 100m de las tropas propias
. Artículo de Aviation Week:
Alon Ben-DavidTel Aviv
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The air force had full air superiority over Gaza and struck 5,262 targets in the strip, dropping 3,600 tons of munitions. Only 11 strikes by SA-7 and SA-18 man-portable air-defense systems against Israeli aircraft were recorded.
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IAF commander Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel decided to act against all safety procedures and ordered the Golani forces to take cover in their armored vehicles. Then, the air force began dropping dozens of 2,000-lb. Joint Direct Attack Munitions on the building sheltering Palestinian combatants , within 100 meters of friendly forces. In 2 hr., Shejaiya absorbed more than 100 tons of explosives, which inflicted massive destruction on the neighborhood. Israeli forces were able to pull back and evacuate their casualties. Palestinians reported that 40 people, both combatants and civilians, were killed in the bombing.
The following day, the Golani brigade reentered Shejaiya to complete its mission. Word about the extremely close air support that the brigade received quickly spread to other brigades, which then asked the air force to provide them with the same support. The air force did that at several other locations, practically destroying the first few rows of buildings on the outskirts of Palestinian urban areas.
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Many believe the turning point of the war occurred on the 46th day, when the air force began striking high-rise buildings in the more upscale neighborhoods of Gaza, which housed the command posts of Hamas. The air force was using what is known as the “knock-on-roof procedure.” After asking inhabitants to evacuate, the IAF fired a small munition to the corner of the roof of the building—a signal that it was about to be destroyed.
Three high-rises were struck that way. Days later, Hamas agreed to a ceasefi re. “I believe we should have struck those buildings earlier,” says an air force of cial. “That might have shortened the length of the war.”
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