El tema de la "fiabilidad" del T-34:
Realmente para tener una opinión definitiva sobre el tema, deberíamos poseer algun test comparativo con otros tanques, o algunos números sobre disponibilidad en
mismas condiciones*, cosa que sólo puede ocurrir en el ámbito de un mismo ejército y en unidades combatiendo en condiciones similares, en caso de que hablemos de operatividad en condiciones de combate justamente.
Como no tenemos nada de eso entre vehículos de ejércitos enfrentados, sólo podemos especular con algunas pruebas circunstanciales.
Del T-34 tenemos el caso del T-34 probado en USA, donde realmente no salió muy bien parado:
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/4635/library/russian_tanks/evaluation_of_russians_tanks_at_aberdeen.htm
Este post muy interesante rescatado del foro del Instituto Dupuy:
Most people who read this forum are probably familiar with the assessment which the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland did on a T-34 and a KV-1 in 1942. A recent article by Boris Kavalerchik about the assessment appeared in the Russian-language magazine Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, issue No. 1, 2006. I found a couple of things striking. First of all, and this is not the striking part, Kavalerchik says that contrary to popular opinion in Russia which holds that the T-34s which were sent to the US and England were intentionally not of the highest quality, in the spring of 1942 five T-34s were specially prepared using the highest quality parts at the Ural Tank Factory (UTZ), which at that time produced the best T-34s in Russia. These five tanks were better than regular T-34s. One was sent to the U.S., one to England, two to the front, and one to the Peoples Commissariat for Tank Production and can now be found mounted on a pedestal in the yard of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow.
The striking part of the article, to me at least, is this part, which comments on Aberdeen's finding that the T-34 broke down beyond repair after 343 kilometers due to dirt getting into the engine's cylinders. Apparently this was very good!
“There was nothing unusual about a tank breaking down after such a short period. At that time T-34 tanks were guaranteed not to break down for 1,000 kilometers, but in practice this number was unattainable. According to a report by the Scientific Institute for Armored Equipment (NIBT) to Ya. N. Fedorenko, the chief of the Red Army's Auto-Armored Directorate, the average distance a T-34 traveled before requiring overhaul (capital repairs) did not exceed 200 kilometers. The Aberdeen T-34 exceeded this.
In 1942 the quality of Soviet tanks had significantly fallen for many understandable reasons. These included the difficulty of reestablishing production by the evacuated factories at new locations, factories switching over to new production, the loss of many supply lines and sources of raw materials, a sharp drop in the average qualification of workers due to losses among experienced workers and the hiring of many new, inexperienced workers including women and teenagers. These new workers worked tirelessly and did everything they could for the front, but they were not qualified. Producing the most tanks possible was the priority, which was understandable since the heavy losses of the initial part of the year had to be made up. Therefore the requirement for quality was reduced, and the military accepted any tank that was built. As a result, in 1942 some 34's could only go 30-35 kilometers before needing an overhaul.
To a certain degree this was justified because tanks, as a rule, did not survive until the expiration of its overhaul life, short as that was. The life of a tank on the front line was not long '' on average 4-10 days (not counting time spent in transit on rail road and being repaired), or from 1-3 attacks. In 1942 the average mileage before being put out of service due to combat was 66.7 kilometers, which was less than half the average mileage before needing an overhaul. The majority of tanks simply didn't live long enough to break down.
The V-2 diesel engine which equipped T-34s and KV-1s was still suffering growing pains. At that time its designers were struggling to extend the diesel's service life to 100 hours, but in reality it seldom lasted more than 60. The engine of the T-34 which was tested at Aberdeen broke down at 72.5 hours, of which 58.45 were under load and 14.05 were while idling. The KV's diesel lasted 66.4 hours. One of the deficiencies of the B-2, besides a short guaranteed life, was an increased fuel consumption (12% above norm), and, especially, a completely unacceptable over-consumption of oil, which exceeded existing norms by 3-8 times! Therefore the range of a T-34 in 1942 was limited not by fuel, but by oil: according to the averages at that time from the technical department of the People's Commissariat for Tank Production, a T-34 carried enough fuel for 200-220 kilometers, but oil for only 145. At the same time German and American tanks didn't require any additional oil; it was simply changed every 2,000 kilometers.â€
También recomiendo la lectura de "T-34 a Mythical weapon", que aunque se le puede criticar el tono "revanchista", no deja de ser una gran referencia respecto al T-34, sus variantes, desarrollo, mitos etc
Por otro lado tenemos la "historia oficial", repetida tantas veces del "super T-34", pero esos son los mismos que nos cuentan lo de Kursk..
Esos problemas realmente no me sorprenden, estando el T-34 en su "infancia" cuando se les vino la invasión encima, y teniendo que relocalizar muchas fábricas a las apuradas, la pérdida de materiales estratégicos, y el hecho de que se tuviera que montar todo con terrible urgencia, usando mano de obra muy poco (si algo) capacitada..
¿Podía ocurrir de otra forma? La propaganda nos dijo que sí, yo estoy seguro que no. Lo que se fabrica mal, sale mal.
Dije antes que no se pueden comparar % de operatividad en distintos ejércitos, y eso lo sostengo en que:
1) mantener operativo a un blindado depende de muchas cosas, no sólo de lo fiable que sea: disponibiliad de repuestos, posibilidad de hacerlos llegar al frente, "tamaño" o importancia que se le de a los servicios/ tarea de reparación
2) doctrina: el ejército alemán si se caracterizaba por algo era por querer rescatar cualquier cosa del campo de batalla. Rescatar vehículos dañados hace que el número de vehículos aumente (o disminuya menos que si no), pero también que la operatividad baje
3) vulnerabilidad de los carros: en todos los tanques, ligeros, medianos o pesados, hay muchas cosas que tienen una resistencia parecida, y que pueden ponerlo fuera de combate temporalmente. Sin embargo, en un blindado ligero al recibir un impacto de grueso calibre, hay más posibilidades de que quede dstruido totalmente que si el mismo impacto lo recibe uno pesado. Eso muestra que algunas veces una baja operatividad puede ser sinónimo de bajas pérdidas
4) situación de combate: una unidad que combate todos los días va a tender a tener una operatividad más baja que otra que es enviada a zonas "tranquilas" con regularidad.
Mirando la situación general en un frente, eso hace que el bando que tiene muy pocas unidades en reserva (típico de el ej. alemán) se vea perjudicado comparando con otro que tendía a tener muchas (a Stalin le obsesionaba el tema de crear reservas)
O en situaciones de avance vertiginoso de parte de un bando, el que avance va a tener una más baja operatividad que el que se retira, pero eso no es malo...: el bando en retirada va a tener que destruir (idealmente..) sus vehículos dañados.
Me gustaría ver de donde sale el 95% ese de los T-34 yugoslavos, aunque me imagino. Lo considero imposible en condiciones de combate.
* Hay pruebas en ese sentido que muestran que, al contrario de lo que se sostiene muchas veces, luego del lógico período de "adaptación", tanto el Tiger como el Panther lograron niveles de fiabilidad similares al Pz IV
