Moderadores: Lepanto, poliorcetes, Edu, Orel
BND escribió:En Dier ez-Zor hay aproximadamente 4.000 soldados pertenecientes a la 104ª Brigada Aerotransportada, la 17ª División de Reserva y a la 137ª Brigada de Artillería. A lo que habrá que sumarle los milicianos del lugar.
La población civil está en torno a los 200.000 habitantes.
Here’s the Key to Understanding the Russian Air Force’s Actions in Syria
The Russian air force is back to bombing hospitals, bakeries, mosques and roads inside areas held by Syrian insurgents
https://warisboring.com/heres-the-key-t ... .mfr6wluh9
It’s been nearly 10 months now that I’ve been closely following Russian military operations in Syria on day-by-day and blow-by-blow basis. I admit I was skeptic right from the start —I expected Russians to indiscriminately bombard civilians in insurgent-held parts of Syria. My standpoint drew criticism not only from many of my readers, but also from most of my colleagues. My contacts who serve as professional military pilots could never imagine their Russian colleagues would do such things as bomb civilians. I’m not the least bit pleased that my worst expectations have become truth. I’m only trying to understand why the Russian air force, known by its Russian acronym “VKS”, is doing what it’s doing in Syria.
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Therefore, the purpose of the Russian military intervention in Syria can be defined as forcing the Syrian opposition into negotiations on Moscow’s conditions, with the aim of stabilizing the position of the regime of Syrian president Bashar Al Assad. Not only the entire Russian military strategy in Syria, but all of its tactics, too, are designed to achieve this goal. And in the Kremlin’s thinking, achieving this goal merits all methods, regardless of consequences.
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The targeting cell issues daily tasking orders some 24 to 36 hours in advance, ordering crews to bomb specific geographic coordinates... Therefore, well above 95 percent of combat sorties by Russian fighter-bombers are flown at medium altitudes between 15,000 and 20,000 feet, where aircraft remain outside the reach of enemy defenses —especially man-portable air-defense systems. Once airborne, aircraft are usually flown on auto-pilot until bombs are released under computer control. Overall, a majority of sorties are quite straightforward and seldom last longer than 45 minutes. Longer sorties include attacks on more than one target and sometimes last up to 1.5 hours, but their essence is still the same— and they still result in computer-controlled bomb-release from medium altitude against geographic coordinates.
Whether the mission is flown by day or by night, more than 80 percent of weaponry deployed by the VKS is so-called “dumb” bombs. Obviously, when dropped from medium altitudes against geographic coordinates —frequently through cloud cover— such weapons are grossly inaccurate.
The VKS is perfectly aware of this and has partially attempted to overcome this problem through deployment of cluster bombs, the effects of which are supposed to cover a bigger area. However —and irrespective of often catastrophic repercussions for the local population— nearly all of the ordnance deployed in Syria dates from the 1980s, and thus frequently fails to detonate.
Because hardly anybody in the West is complaining, and because it’s unlikely that any Russian is ever going to be held accountable for dozens of massacres perpetrated by the VKS in Syria, Moscow needs not care about negative consequences.
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Conclusions
The mentality of the VKS’ operations in Syria must be understood within a uniquely Russian context, in a fundamentally different conception of warfare and the role of air power in it. Russian commanders and their pilots are not dumb —they are knowledgeable about the performance parameters, and limitations, of their aircraft and about the effects their weapons have. Similarly, the intelligence services providing them with targeting data know what are they doing and why.
However, what might appear to Westerners as unimaginative tactics and a complete disregard for human life are —in the eyes of Russian political and military commanders— serving the purpose of achieving a political aim by military means.
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Nevertheless, because failure in Syria is completely unacceptable for Moscow —and by now it’s obvious that the VKS has failed to enforce the desired political outcome— Russian leaders have ordered VKS aircrews to bombard areas held by the Syrian opposition. The intention is to make life unbearable in those areas so that oppositions leaders accept Moscow’s conditions. This is the reason for the all-around human tragedy we are witnessing in Syria these days.
Only time will tell how the professionalism and self-respect of Russia’s aviators will be affected by the high rate of non-combatant casualties they are causing.
https://warisboring.com/heres-the-key-t ... .mfr6wluh9
Orel escribió:Un análisis sobre la campaña aérea rusa en Siria.
My contacts who serve as professional military pilots could never imagine their Russian colleagues would do such things as bomb civilians.
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