En esta sección se ha dicho, que la batalla por Shusha será tema de estudio, pues lo cierto es que así ha sido, de echo el Modern War Institute ha sacado una relación sobre los avances azeríes por parte de las fuerzas especiales de dicho país en la región, y el desempeño, aún con algún que otro error y desliz, es bastante notable, especialmente si consideramos que parte de las operaciones las hicieron sin apoyo aéreo ni de artillería, y que se enfrentaron en encuentros cercanos con los defensores en inferioridad numérica y táctica. Una de las cosas que apuntan, es que tenemos una idea bastante contaminada por los medios sobre la misma, creemos que la superioridad tecnológica de Azerbaiján fué la encargada de terminar el trabajo, y Susha es un claro ejemplo de que el ejército Azerí puede desempeñarse de forma correcta en un entorno urbano, y que los entornos urbanos siguen siendo claves para ganar una guerra;
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Most of the reporting and analysis on the war focused on the technological superiority of the Azerbaijani military. Some commentators claimed that the advanced technologies and tactics used by Azerbaijan to decimate Armenian forces—such as the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle or Israeli Harop loitering munition (often called a kamikaze drone)—and use of proxy forces demonstrate a change in the character of warfare, show that the relevance of armor and static militaries may have come to an end, or provide the best hint of the future of war. Despite all the coverage, the lessons missed about the Nagorno-Karabakh War are the ones showing how urban warfare remains a key part of modern combat. The most important battle of the Nagorno-Karabakh War occurred in the city of Shusha. Once Shusha fell, Armenia surrendered and entered a lopsided agreement, ceding massive amounts of their previously held territories."_
Por ejemplo, para el 7 de Noviembre del año 2020, se produjo una fuerte neblina, los Armenios aprovecharon para reorganizar sus fuerzas blindadas ante la incapacida de los TB2 Bayraktar turcos por golpearlos, e intentaron desalojar a los Azeríes, sin embargo los Azeríes rechazaron en 3 ocasiones a los Armenios. Tras varios fracasos, los Azeríes contra-atacaron y decidieron la batalla a su favor, favoreciendo la resolución pactada entre países para un alto el fuego y la cesión de grandes extensiones de territorio, muchos de los cuales habían formado parte histórica de Azerbaiján, pero otros que formaron parte histórica de Armenia;
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Despite the counterattack, the Azerbaijani forces held their ground. They formed a defensive line in the Shusha forests and after repulsing three Armenian counterattacks, returned on the offensive, capturing the building of Shusha Executive Power and beginning to drive out Armenian forces, deliberately clearing buildings and larger areas in the city. The battle for Shusha ultimately came down to building-to-building close combat."_
Fuerzas Especiales de Azerbaiján acantonadas en Shusha.
Según la misma fuente, se concluye que;
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Cities remain operational and strategic objectives in war. The capture of Shusha was a major strategic victory for Azerbaijan, and it ultimately decided the outcome of the war. Once Shusha fell, Armenia was forced to surrender out of fear that Azerbaijani forces would be able to target and possibly seize the territory’s capital, Stepanakert, just a handful of kilometers away. Cities have always been operational and strategic objectives in war. They are the centers of political and economic power for nations. They also start, grow, and expand along trade routes, key passes through ground that is otherwise challenging to maneuver through, or coastlines where ports connect global naval supply lines. In short, they are very often built on key terrain, and at the very least they offer control over important lines of communication. As cities grow in number, size, and complexity, some argue that military forces should simply avoid them and the unique challenges they pose. Shusha shows that this is simply not an option. They are unavoidable and militaries must prepare to operate in them to be effective in any war."_
Fuentes;
https://mwi.usma.edu/the-battle-of-shus ... abakh-war/