Moderadores: Lepanto, poliorcetes, Edu, Orel
OA-X: Is the U.S. Air Force Ready to Purchase a New Light Attack Aircraft?
Dave Majumdar
March 28, 2017
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The United States Air Force is expected to hold demonstrations this summer to show off the capabilities of a new light attack aircraft the service might eventually purchase under a new OA-X program.
The Air Force had attempted to buy a light attack aircraft in 2008 under a previous iteration of the OA-X program, but ultimately that effort came to naught. The previous OA-X effort came at a time when the Air Force was fighting two counterinsurgency wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan, but political forces and bureaucratic inertia within the service carried the day. How this latest iteration of the OA-X will fare is an open question—but undoubtedly there are those within the Air Force who will vigorously fight the purchase of any new tactical aircraft that isn’t the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Nonetheless, the Air Force is proceeding with its planned demonstration effort. The hope is that an operational OA-X would eventually free up more expensive fighter aircraft such as the Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle or F-35 Lightning II for missions against more challenging foes.
“We want to see if there’s a business case there,” acting Air Force Secretary Lisa Disbrow said during her speech at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium.
“This concept could free up higher-cost, higher-performance platforms from doing low-threat missions, which would allow us time to prepare for more complex threats with those assets. It could also help us absorb new pilots and be useful as we work with allies and partners.”
But at its core, the Air Force is torn between investing in expensive high-end multirole combat aircraft or cheaper counterinsurgency (COIN) machines that might not be useful outside of certain specific situations.
“The Air Force is torn,” Richard Aboulafia, vice president of the Teal Group aerospace consultancy told The National Interest.
“On the one hand, it wants to be seen as helpful in the current Afghanistan and anti-ISIS conflicts, but on the other hand it doesn’t want to make a big investment in a fleet of planes that would have absolutely no relevance outside the current Afghanistan and anti-ISIS conflicts. COIN proponents tend to emphasize tactics over strategy; this is kind of the aeronautical equivalent of that tendency.”
Former Air Force B-52 pilot and airpower analyst Mark Gunzinger at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments said that this time around, the Air Force is likely serious about the OA-X. The service desperately needs more aircraft to provide more flying hours for its pilots and a low-cost OA-X could be just the answer the Air Force is looking for.
“The Air Force has been clear it is pursuing a light attack aircraft – perhaps more than a single variant over time – that could support counterinsurgency operations in permissive environments as well as increase the number of cockpits available to season pilots at an affordable cost per flying hour,” Gunzinger told The National Interest.
“I think the latter point is too quickly dismissed by some critics of this initiative. The Air Force has a pilot shortfall that is projected to grow to over 700 in the next couple of years. Moreover, while the Air Force’s Combat Air Force has shrunk to 55 fighter squadrons and a handful of bomber squadrons, there are other critical positions that require pilots such as joint staffs, operational planning staffs, etc. The Air Force is going to produce more pilots, but they will need cockpits for them – and a light attack aircraft with a two-pilot cockpit and a cost per flying hour of $4-5,000 could be a cost-effective alternative. Add to that the availability of several off-the-shelf (or nearly so) aircraft; this becomes an option the Congress could fund that would have a near-immediate impact on the Air Force’s readiness. There is also the potential for foreign military sales to allies and partners. So, this said, I think the initiative has a good chance of succeeding.”
Col. Michael Pietrucha—one of the originators of the 2008 OA-X concept—wrote in War on the Rocks that the demand signal for airpower fighting counterinsurgency wars shows no sign of abating.
“We can no longer pretend that the demand for combat airpower in irregular conflicts will end soon,” Pietrucha wrote.
“The re-emergence of great power competition does not automatically translate into a reduction of irregular threats. Faced with a problem set that will not go away and a fighter/attack fleet that has been ridden hard and put away wet, it makes perfect sense to add combat capability quickly, and it is entirely reasonable that that airpower be designed for the conflicts we face today. OA-X is intended to be an additive capability — not to replace any other element of the fighter/attack fleet. The Air Force is not trading away its ability to fight a peer adversary, but it is making sure that the forces necessary for a modern theater war are ready for that fight by not frittering the lifespans of our advanced legacy fighters away on tasks that could be done as well for far less cost. The Air Force has done this before, and it has good reason to try again.”
Gunzinger agreed that the Air Force needs the OA-X. However—like Pietrucha—he noted that a light attack aircraft is not a substitute for a high-end warplane that can take on the most capable enemy threats such as Russia and China. “Of course, I do not see a light attack aircraft as a weapon system that should take the place of current and planned 5th gen and eventually 6th gen combat aircraft,” Gunzinger said.
Ultimately, only time will tell if the Air Force ends up buying the OA-X. Institutional forces within the service are strong, only determined leadership from the chief of staff, Gen. David Goldfein—and whomever the next secretary is—can push the OA-X through to fruition.
Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
Posted 29 March 2017
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More direct involvement began in June 2015, when the UAE deployed at least one, and probably two, Iomax AT-802U Border Patrol Aircraft ?to an unidentified Libyan air base, subsequently establishing a military base at Al-Khadim Airport in Marj province in eastern Libya, around 100km from the port city of Benghazi.
The new UAE facilities were up and running by March 2016, and have progressively grown in size. Transport aircraft have frequently been seen at the base, including chartered Il-76 and turboprop-powered Il-18 transport aircraft.
From here, the UAE Air Force and Air Defence (UAE AF&AD) has operated at least six Air Tractors (apparently with their national markings hidden), using them in attacks against Benghazi’s Shura Council Islamist militants, and providing close air support for LNA forces, and almost certainly for UAE special forces operating on the ground.
It seems that the UAE AF&AD Air Tractors were more feared by the enemy, though they flew fewer missions, and delivered fewer weapons, than the LNA’s own MiG-23 fighter-bombers. What they did drop, they dropped with greater accuracy, and they were also able to loiter longer, waiting for fleeting targets to ‘pop up’ and be attacked.
In September 2016, Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (SCBR) published an infographic showing the types of aircraft that had been attacking them in Benghazi. According to the infographic, the LNA’s MiG-23s flew 320 missions; Mi-17 helicopters flew 87 sorties, while the AT-802Us flew just 27 bombing missions in the same period. It also listed 235 reconnaissance flights by the S-100 Camcopter, and 364 performed by ‘MQ-9 Reaper’ drones, though this may have been a misidentification of the UAE’s Chinese-supplied Wing Loong unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).
Weapons used by the Emirati Air Tractors in Libya include Turkish-supplied Mk 82 bomb bodies fitted with GBU-12 laser-guidance kits. It is not known whether the aircraft have used the AGM-114 Hellfire missile, GAU-19/A .50-caliber gun pod, or DAGR or Cirit laser-guided rockets, all of which can be carried by the type, and all of which are known to have been used in combat (though this may have been in Yemen, where the Air Tractor is also in action).
Satellite imagery shows that the Air Tractors have been supported by at least two helicopters (probably Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks), and a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Camcopters and Chinese-built Chengdu Wing Loong armed drones.
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que yo sepa todavía puede ser un programa doble. Está por verse.
Orel escribió:que yo sepa todavía puede ser un programa doble. Está por verse.
Claro, si me refería a que hay un posible programa por avión CAS/COIN "pequeño", y otro posible programa aparte por sustituto del A-10, "mayor".
De hecho, si no fuera por la división artificial entre ejércitos de tierra y fuerzas aéreas
lo suyo seria emplear en aviación tripulada tres escalones.
Orel escribió:De hecho, si no fuera por la división artificial entre ejércitos de tierra y fuerzas aéreas
lo suyo seria emplear en aviación tripulada tres escalones.
Eso podrían permitírselo las dos potencias mundiales del momento. ¿Y los escalones de UAS? Los demás no podemos ni debemos permitirnos operar tanto modelo distinto, cuando encima empiezan a generalizarse los UCAS de control remoto, y luego vendrán los autónomos. Que esos sí que van a abaratar costes, aumentar persistencia y reducir riesgos.
COncretamente, me refería a que las misiones CAS, que deberían ser orgánicas a operaciones terrestres,
Ya tenemos dos escalones
No sé si es por el "efecto túnel" de los UAS actuales, por su dependencia absoluta de las municiones guiadas o por qué.
Se podría pensar que con los UCAS no harían falta los turbohélices. No digo que no en el futuro, pero si la USAF está planteando en serio la adquisición de turbohélices tras varios programas propios y ajenos exitosos, digo yo que "por algo será"
Ahora pensemos que se adquirirá un entrenador turbohélice. Se podrían adquirir 10 derivados armados del mismo por el precio de un F-35, y el coste por hora de vuelo sería casi un 90% inferior también. Para atizarle a toyotas no hace falta ni legacies ni superaviones de interdicción, y encima ese turbohélice será capaz de estar más horas sobre un objetivo.
COncretamente, me refería a que las misiones CAS, que deberían ser orgánicas a operaciones terrestres,
se llevan a cabo de una forma artificialmente independiente desde la 2a GM.
Esta división propició la creación de helos de ataque para que los ejércitos de tierra dispusieran de un recurso CAS verdaderamente orgánico, siendo que sus costes y envolventes de vuelo son dramáticamente superiores e inferiores a medios de ala fija
Pero si eso no es novedoso
Orel escribió:Israel, con una enorme experiencia en COIN, también lleva lustros usando drones armables y no turbohélices CAS/COIN.
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