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Interesante artículo sobre capacidad AS de la PLAAF/PLANAF china
21/7/2018 by antonio
Hola a todos;
Seguidamente os adjunto el link de un excelente artículo en The Diplomat sobre las capacidades AS de la fuerza aérea y la fuerza aérea naval de China.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/where-a ... ded-bombs/
Para los que no queréis leer mucho os resumo lo más interesante;However, despite these advances in the PLA’s strike platforms, observers may note how the PLA appears to lack widespread deployment of any single DAM family, similar to the U.S. military’s Paveway or JDAM family.
Básicamente el artículo critica que las armas de ataque al suelo guiadas chinas sean sobretodo de crucero y largo alcance y que no tienen una familia vasta y de uso general como las Paveway/JDAM.Today, the bulk of the PLAAF and PLANAF’s modern strike capability can be divided into the strategic bomber category and the strike capable fighter category. The PLA fields under 200 H-6 family bombers beA combination of over 240 JH-7/A strike fighters, 100 Su-30MKK/MK2 multirole strike capable Flankers, and a burgeoning fleet of under 100 J-16 multirole strike capable Flankers, provide the bulk of the PLAAF and PLANAF’s strike fighter fleet, and are all capable of fielding precision guided weapons as part of their regular weapons suite, with a payload of about 8 or more tons. Additionally, about 400 J-10 variants are in service, of which at least some have been observed carrying air-to-ground laser guided bombs and anti-radiation missiles, suggesting these aircraft have been integrated with a secondary air-to-ground role.
Los aviones con capacidad AS guiada son los H-6 (una versión propia de los Tu-16) y aviones de ataque tipo JH-7A/B, Su-30 (que incluyen versiones específicas chinas como el J-16) y algunos J-10.However, regardless of whether DAMs are used in the CAS role or air interdiction role, it must be preceded by attaining air superiority, preferably with sufficient suppression of the opponent’s ground based air defenses. This can be observed in the strike campaigns conducted by U.S. and NATO air forces in operations over the Middle East
Y aquí es donde el autor argumenta su opinión. China está diseñando primero una capacidad de ataque más "estratégica" y de supresión de defensas (SEAD) dejando en segundo lugar la capacidad CAS y de ataque al suelo táctico.By contrast, most large SOWs have onboard propulsion systems that can greatly extend their range beyond the reach of opposing air defenses, and provide greater flexibility and survivability against opposing combat air patrols. Therefore, SOWs can be conceptualized as strike weapons that can be used even if an adversary has a broadly operational air force and air defense system.However, going forward, it is likely that the PLA will continue to field SOWs as the mainstay of their air-to-ground strike capability, even though the technology for a widespread DAM capability is easily within their grasp.
En este sentido, parece que la estrategia china tiene más en común con la soviético/rusa que la occidental. Buscan una capacidad de ataque capaz de evadir las defensas aéreas y las nutridas fuerzas aéreas occidentales. Muy en línea soviética.
Lo más llamativo es el impresionante número de aviones de ataque a tierra del que disponen (con capacidad guiada AS), que supera con mucho, a Rusia.
De ahí que sostenga que Rusia nunca podrá ser una superpotencia como China o EEUU. Su economía, su población y su vasto territorio limita mucho la capacidad económico-industrial-militar en el largo plazo. Las cosas pueden estirarse un poco, pero no demasiado.
Luego, China cuando gane relevancia internacional y tenga plenamente desarrollada una capacidad de ataque estratégica (que pasa por portaaviones y nuevos bombarderos), sin duda tendrá que virar hacia una capacidad táctica real. Lo cual implica poder desplazar aviones que ya tiene a territorios de ultramar. Tal y como hace la USAF en Afganistán o Irak anteriormente.
A China le sucede con el armamento A/S táctico como a Rusia...
21/7/2018 by frostilicus
...En teoría en los festivales aéreos, delante de sus aviones hay un montón de bombas y misiles guiados, pero a la hora de la verdad, cuando se ven ejercicios militares con fuego real, lo que lanzan es mucha bomba tonta y cohetes no guiados y padecen la misma falta de pods designadores que los propios rusos.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/where-a ... ded-bombs/
17 August, 2018
...Over the last three years, the PLA has rapidly expanded its overwater bomber operating areas, gaining experience in critical maritime regions and likely training for strikes against U.S. and allied targets...
It notes the H-6K, which has more range and endurance than the H-6G, can carry six land attack cruise missiles that offer an “offensive strike capability against Guam.”... It adds that future H-6 missions could target Taiwán...
Longer term, the report notes that China is developing a stealth bomber that is likely to be designated H-20. This aircraft could make its debut in the mid-2020s. It is likely to have an 8,500km (4,600nm) range, and a payload of 10t. “A photograph of a possible H-20 prototype depicted a flying wing airframe akin to the B-2 bomber and X-47B UCAV,” it says.
In addition, a separate air-refuellable bomber could reach initial operational capability before the H-20.
The report notes that Beijing continues to deploy the Y-20 strategic airlifter, more advanced fighter aircraft, such as the J-20, and improve AEW&C assets. It also notes challenges. These include Beijing’s well-publicised weakness in building advanced aircraft engines, as well as trouble with radars. The report says that both of these are problems for the J-20 and FC-31 programmes.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... il-451217/
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