Las imágenes de los buques de la Armada alemana que ayudan en el rescate de refugiados desgarrados retratan la cara pública de la Bundeswehr de una manera que ningún Eurofighter o Leopard 2 puede hacer.
Otros bajo la tirania de la magdalena
Moderadores: Lepanto, poliorcetes, Edu, Orel
Las imágenes de los buques de la Armada alemana que ayudan en el rescate de refugiados desgarrados retratan la cara pública de la Bundeswehr de una manera que ningún Eurofighter o Leopard 2 puede hacer.
Silver Surfer , artículo
ildefonso machuca escribió:hola a TODOS...
el problema de la armada alemana es el mismo de todas las armadas a nivel mundial... los requerimientos operaciones "impuestos" por doctrinas no propias "imponen" el diseño y compra de buques que no serian los realmente necesarios y esto "Impone" costos y gastos que no se pueden asumir y por lo tanto a la mas minima de recortes economicos, pues zas... las FAN son las primeras en sufrir el tijerazo
SI las K130 son buques pequeños para el estandar y la doctrina de la US NAVY... pero en mi opinion son suficientes para los alemanes... claro que a la hora de tener que "aportar" a una flota conjunta, las K130 seran las cenicientas...
peor es por ejemplo (y de nuevo en mi opinion) tener buques capaces como las F100 españolas y a mitad de una singladura conjunta con la US NAVY, tengan que retirarse a puerto por ordenes del gobierno dejando el pelero...
agur
rubin75 escribió:Silver Surfer , artículo
Muchas Gracias Silver por compartir este artículo. Muy devastadora la situación de la Armada alemana.
¿Por qué la primera potencia no nuclear de la Unión europea tiene así sus fuerzas armadas?
¿Tienes acceso a algún artículo de parecido tono sobre la Armada francesa?
Kique escribió:Submarino de la Armada alemana U212A con lo que parecen ser minas montadas en fajas externas.
Introduction
Whether we like it or not, we live in an era of a fundamental reorientation of the international system. It doesn’t matter if you follow the American paradigm of “Great Power Competition”1 or the Chinese2 and Russian3 interpretation of a “multipolar world order.” Global stability is being threatened by hegemonic tendencies of power. The perceptions of the United States, China, and Russia are principally the same, but are viewed from very different vantage points. After the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War and a short time of American unipolarity, the international system has entered a new phase that will be defined by the inter-relations of these three actors.
In public discussions in Germany, and even amongst German “defense professionals,” this understanding does not seem to have been established very well. Russian aggression against Ukraine, and particularly the annexation of Crimea in 2014, was a watershed moment in German security and defense politics. However, Russia’s confrontational politics toward the West is still seen as a specific transatlantic and isolated phenomenon that can be reduced to questions of defense and deterrence at the northeastern borders of the NATO alliance, the “Northflank.”
No one in Germany will deny that China is posing a strategic challenge. This, however, is perceived to have above all economical relevance for Germany. And it is mostly seen as something totally unrelated to security issues on this side of the globe and more as an intensifying bilateral American-Chinese tussle. Illegal Chinese claims in the South China Sea will be met with open critique by German officials and diplomatic demarches. But China’s behavior is predominantly perceived as an economic threat to the freedom of navigation the German trade-oriented economy is dependent upon.
However, a self-centered perspective will not answer the challenges Germany is facing. For Germany, unlike most other countries, strengthening a rules-based order and the international organizations and structures that support it is not only – in the “end, ways, means” understanding of strategy – a way to achieve national interests. Derived from its geographic location, painful history, and ethical conviction, it is an end in itself. To safeguard this interest, political decision-makers rely on a military-strategic analysis that takes in the intensifying global rivalry in its entirety. Otherwise, Germany – and with it Europe – will face the Melian’s fate that Thucydides described over 2000 years ago, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”4 The lines of conflict of this great power struggle run, with little to no exception, through the maritime domain, including the Indo-Pacific, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. It is therefore particularly important for maritime professionals to take an active part in this strategy discussion and provide a maritime perspective. The following theses are intended to contribute to this debate and attempt to sketch practical conclusions from maritime strategic analysis.
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