Ese ejército hizo una estimación desastrosa (brutalmente optimista) del tiempo de mantenimiento necesario por cada aeronave de ala fija. Sucedió porque para hacer la estimación: no usó datos históricos correctos, desconocía el proceso de mantenimiento que se realizaba realmente y no había comunicación entre las distintas instalaciones de mantenimiento. Vamos, un cagadón.
Eso ha llevado a que desde 2014 hasta 2019, la US Navy haya dedicado a mantenimiento de aviones, 62.000 días menos de lo planeado. Un 48% de las veces no ha cumplido la planificación de mantenimiento.
Por dar una idea, en ese mismo periodo la USAF dedicó 22.500 días menos, vemos que la US Navy casi triplica ese fallo de previsión:
https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing ... 69.article
Poor record sharing and planning cause US Navy (USN) aircraft maintenance delays
24 June 2020
The USN fleet of fixed-wing aircraft have spent more than 62,000 days in maintenance beyond what was expected since fiscal year 2014.
The service’s poor record sharing and maintenance planning has caused depot maintenance to be behind schedule 48% of the time on average between 2014 and 2019, says the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a new report published 23 June.
The USN underestimated the amount of time it needed to complete fixed-wing aircraft maintenance by an average of about 55 days per aircraft.
...
In general, the GAO says the USN’s problems estimating maintenance needs are the result of three issues: the service did not effectively use historic data on aircraft turnaround time, navy personnel were unaware of maintenance done by operational units or other maintenance facilities, and it did not have a formal process to communicate and coordinate maintenance work between depots.
By comparison, surveyed US Air Force fixed-wing aircraft spent 22,572 fewer days in maintenance than expected between FY2014 and FY2019, notes the GAO.
...
https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing ... 69.article